Summary
A comment on the desirability of proportional representation and
the need for the proportionality representatives to be selected
from closely defeated candidates rather than by party officials. I
also will suggest a methodology for the implementation of this
approach.
Why proportional representation?
In British Columbia, over the past several decades, we have a
history of the major political parties vying for election having
major differences in their fundamental view of the role of
government. This has resulted in major shifts of policy whenever
there is a change in the government. These major shifts in policy
are counter-productive because they require restructuring in both
the public and private sector, create uncertainty about
expectations among all publics in BC and beyond, and indicate the
likelihood of continuing long-term instability. Generally these
changes in the government are the result of only a small proportion
of the electorate shifting from one party to another and only
rarely reflect a general dissatisfaction with the work or policies
of the party in power. Proportional representation results in all
views held by a large number of voters being represented in the
legislature and, therefore, the composition of the legislature more
accurately reflects the views of the electorate. Such
representation will keep both majority and coalition governments
aware of their fragility and thereby tend to reduce policy
extremes. Proportional representation will also encourage voter
turnout, as each potential voter will realize that when they vote
their views will have spokespersons in the legislative assembly
somewhat proportional to the number of voters who share these
views.
A fully proportional legislature has proven to be impractical,
if not unworkable, in other jurisdictions. A form in which we elect
some legislators on a plurality basis and others represent the
proportion of support received by the various political parties may
be the most desirable way of implementing proportional
representation. I would suggest that 50% of the seats be filled on
the present ‘first past the post” basis and
50% be filled based on the proportion of votes received by the
competing political parties.
The selection of proportionality
representatives
It is my fundamental belief that members of the legislature
should be selected by the voters rather than the leaders or
officials of any particular political party. It follows that any
selection of proportionality representatives should come from those
candidates who have received the most support from the voters in
their constituency. This also implies that all candidates who win
their constituency are entitled to a seat in the legislature.
Persons selected on the basis of proportionality would be in
addition to those elected by their constituency. I, and many with
whom I have spoken, also see the selection of the proportionality
representatives from a listing of possibilities prepared by the
political parties as being anti-democratic because the legislators
are then selected by party officials rather than the electorate. It
may be that political parties would prefer to select their
representatives rather than have it done by the voters but this
would be undemocratic. Political parties now select persons to run
as their candidates who already support the views and policies of
the party and, if the initial selection was done properly, they
should be prepared to live by the choices of the electorate. Any
provision that results in proportional representatives being
selected from a party list rather than narrowly defeated candidates
is not only undemocratic but may well result in the concept of
proportional representation being rejected by voters should they be
asked to choose.
A suggested implementation methodology
Any suggestion that results in more people having seats in the
legislature than those elected on a plurality basis requires that
there be either an increase in the number of seats or a reduction
in the number of constituencies. Stability of government suggests
that some number should be elected directly and the balance be the
proportionality representatives. Let us say my proposed 50% model
is accepted. With the 50% model the number of seats would have to
be doubled to accommodate the 50% proportionality representatives
or the number of constituencies reduced to one-half the present
number. Almost any combination of directly elected and
proportionality representatives are possible. My preference would
be to reduce the number of constiuencies by about one third and
thereby also increasing the seats by one third.
If we accept the principle that the voters should decide who
sits in the legislature then the selection of proportionality
representatives could, in my view, be done in one of two ways.
Either by selecting those who came closest to winning or those who
received the highest proportion of the votes in their riding.
My preference for the selection of the proportionality
representatives would be on the basis of how close they came to
winning the seat. That is, by a comparison of the share of the vote
they received to that received by the winning candidate. (For
example if, in a given constituency, candidate A received 40% of
the votes cast and candidate B received 35% of the votes cast,
candidate B’s score would be 35/40 or .875. Candidate A
would take the seat. If candidate B’s party was awarded
an additional seat based on the proportion of votes received by
that party’s candidates then that .875 would be
compared with the similarly calculated score of other defeated
candidates belonging to same party. If, in another constituency,
candidate D represented the same party as B and received 40% of the
vote compared to the winners 52%, then candidate D’s
score would be 40/52 or .769. Because candidate B came
closer to being elected than candidate D, candidate B’s
score is higher than D’s, therefor candidate B would be
the party's proportionality representative).
The alternative would be to use the percentage of votes received
by the losing candidates as the score for each candidate. While
this may be simpler and somewhat easier to calculate and understand
it may not be as desirable as the previous methodology because this
score could be greatly influenced by the number of candidates
running in that particular constituency.
This methodology would apply regardless of the percentages of
seats allocated to proportionality representatives. The result, of
course, would be that some constituencies would have two or,
possibly, three representatives while others would only have one.
While not particularly desirable that is preferable to having some
constituencies only represented by people who did not have a
plurality in their constituency or who were selected by party
officials rather than the electorate.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I give my goodwill and best wishes to the members
of the Citizens’ Assembly and hope for a successful
conclusion to your deliberations. Your devotion and
commitment to achieving a workable and improved legislative
structure for the people of BC should be recognized and appreciated
by all the citizens of our great province.
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