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Submission SCARLETT-0474 (Online)

Submission By Donald Scarlett
AddressKaslo, BC,
Organization
Date20040525
CategoryElectoral system change
Abstract
MMP offers the best solution to the failings of the FPTP electoral system and can be expected to yield numerous social and political advantages and benefits. [5 pages]

Submission Content
My submission is not written on behalf of any party or organization, though I have been involved in politics at municipal, provincial and federal levels for many years.  It approaches electoral reform from a public interest perspective.  First-past-the-post (FPTP) is judged to be contrary to the Charter of Rights and numerous examples are given to show that mixed-member proportional representation (MMP) offers social and political benefits.  Finally, multi-round election systems, multi-member ridings, and the single transferable vote (STV) are compared to MMP.

Electoral reform should be approached first and foremost from the perspective of public interest.  I have been involved for many years in political activity from municipal to federal levels, but have avoided expressing the views of any organization or political party in this submission and.  All political parties and many organizations suffer from a conflict of interest in dealing with electoral reform.  Their submissions, though valuable, must be read with a full understanding of those interests and how they impact the public interest in general.

As an electrician and an engineer with no legal training, I have used a layperson’s understanding of the Canadian Charter of Rights to evaluate our electoral system.  I believe that the FPTP electoral system offends against principles that underly the Charter, namely democracy, equal treatment and one-person-one vote.

We call our political system a democracy because our governments are elected by the adult citizenry as a whole.  But some Canadian citizens have less access to electoral influence than others.  Unless they happen to support one of the few political parties that elect members in their riding, their votes are wasted.  In fact, in a multi-party FPTP electoral system—which is what we have in B.C.—considerably more than 50% of the votes cast are typically wasted.  This is equivalent disenfranchising more than half the those voters.  It would make no difference to the election outcome if these citizens did not vote at all.

I don’t feel comfortable calling this electoral system a democracy.  Consider for a moment: not so long ago, women—over 50% of the population—weren’t allowed to vote.  Canadians of Chinese ancestry, native Americans and even white adult males who didn’t own land, were also excluded from voting.  Such a political system—in which a small, select group controls the government—would not be called a democracy today.

Our electoral system has progressed and improved over the past century, but as long as large numbers of voters are consistently disenfranchised, we’re a long way from democracy.  Nevertheless, good-hearted and principled people improved our electoral system during the past century by extending the franchise to all adult citizens, so we can be hopeful that a new generation will make further improvements.  We might finally be able to justify claiming to live in a democracy.

I believe proportional representation is the only electoral system which satisfies the spirit—and possibly the legal wording—of the Canadian Charter of Rights.  It addresses the principles of equal treatment and one-person-one-vote.  But, taking human and political realities into account, a new electoral system should retain familiar and accepted characteristics—such as local representation—as much as possible.  Therefore, a MMP system, with a mixture of locally-elected and list candidates, would be preferred.  In addition to satisfying Charter principles, MMP offers the following advantages:

  • FPTP electoral systems create majority governments even when there is no majority favouring the winning party.  Our parliamentary system, combined with party discipline, converts majority government into a virtual dictatorship.  Many of the political scandals we have endured in B.C. have been allowed to germinate and grow under majority governments which simply have not been accountable to an effective opposition or the public.  Minority governments, which would be more likely under MMPR, cannot afford to be tolerant of scandal and abuse of power.
  • Big business and other special interests will always seek to buy political influence, but if they are allowed to dominate government the public interest is likely to suffer.  As long as governments enjoy essentially absolute power, these interests will have a strong incentive to purchase politicians and parties because the return on investment can be huge.  Because parties will less often gain absolute power under MMP, the incentive for special interests to influence government outside elections will diminish.  This will help ensure the public interest maintains its priority in government. 
  • Strategic voting is a highly undesirable by-product of the FPTP electoral system.  It is an attempt by a citizen who is expecting to be disenfranchised by an unfair electoral system to regain some political power and the expense of his/her principles.  MMP allows nearly all votes cast to count towards the voter’s preferred party, thereby making strategic voting unnecessary.
  • Splitting the vote is a common problem of the FPTP electoral system.  Voters are not just disenfranchised, but end up helping the very party they least want to elect.  To avoid this perverse state of affairs, voters are compelled to vote strategically and parties are compelled to abandon their supporters or ally with other parties that have different principles.  MMP reduces the likelihood that voters will have to worry about vote splitting, because governments will generally form from coalitions of like-minded parties, and (thanks to the proportionality of elected members) they will fairly represent the majority of voters.
  • Polling has been used to an increasing degree by governments and political parties to influence the public prior to elections.  Restrictions on the public release of polling results enforced by Elections BC and Elections Canada indicate that this practice is contrary to democratic principles, presumably because it can cause voters to change their voting intentions for strategic reasons.  Under MMP, the incentive for citizens to vote strategically disappears, so political parties will have less incentive to use polling results to influence election outcomes.
  • Negative voting—that is, voting out of fear or anger, rather than for policies or principles the voter believes in—is not unusual in our electoral system.  It arises from frustration at the unfairness of a past election (arguably this was one of the causes of the lopsided 2001 B.C. election results) or fear of a future unfair election result which can lead to a reactive type of strategic voting.  It distorts the whole concept of democracy, which is based on citizens voting for their preference.  Under MMP, citizens will perceive election results to be more fair and will be less likely to resort to negative voting.
  • Huge political swings from one election to another have been direct consequences of the FPTP electoral system because it tends to create majority governments even when the vote counts for major parties are relatively close.  These swings create instability in our governmental institutions, enormous waste as successive governments undo the work of their predecessors and anger and desperation in the public service.  MMP would likely eliminate this unproductive election outcome by putting an end to the artificial amplification of election victory margins.
  • Falling voter turnout is a concern to any who believe in democracy and citizens’ participation in public affairs.  Although it is likely caused by a combination of factors, major contributors are disillusionment with an electoral system that is perceived as being unfair, disenfranchises many voters, and prevents many voters from voting for their preference.  MMP, by restoring the public perception of election fairness and allowing citizens to vote effectively for their preferred parties, should renew the interest of many citizens in voting.
  • Adversarial politics and dirty campaigning is all too common in B.C. and Canada.  It is highly unproductive and may damage our political institutions over time.  The fact that the FPTP electoral system tends to create majority governments from small election victory margins raises the stakes and encourages adversarial behaviour.  Moreover, if minority governments—which subsist on co-operation between parties—are artificially suppressed by the electoral system, a culture of competition will dominate over compromise and co-operation.  MMP would remove the artificial bias towards majority governments which encourages adversarial politics. 
  • Another consequence of the FPTP electoral system is domination of the political system by two large, powerful political parties which grow to resemble each other.  This has been more true of Canadian federal politics than B.C. politics.  Since a small margin of electoral victory can so easily create a majority government, there is a tendency for alternative voices and policies to be lost as the dominant parties compete for the small “swing” portion of the electorate.  MMP would restore the vitality and variety in our political system by allowing a greater diversity of parties to elect candidates and increasing the likelihood that these parties—through coalition-building—could influence governmental policy.
  • The FPTP electoral system allows the political system to be dominated by certain geographical regions that happen to consistently support one party.  Such domination effectively increases the influence of a vote cast in that region relative to votes cast elsewhere—contrary to the one-person-one-vote principle.  MMP restores that principle and in doing so increases the incentive to parties to cultivate province-wide and inclusive visions and policies.
  • Rural and regional representation has tended to be weak in the past.  MMP should improve the situation because if political parties have the incentive to woo voters all over the province in order to elect more list candidates, they will make a greater effort to address rural and regional interests than they presently do.
  • It has for some time been an accepted objective across Canada to increase the representation of women and minorities in government.  FPTP elections in individual ridings tend to give candidates who are white, male and wealthy a strong advantage.  By allowing parties to nominate list candidates who do not compete in local elections, MMP should enable more high quality women and minority candidates to be elected.  Political parties would have an incentive to nominate such candidates because under MMP every voter—including segments of our society that are presently marginalized and disenfranchised—would have equal electoral influence.
  • Inducing young citizens to vote has been difficult in the past, at least in part because of disillusionment with a political system which is adversarial, dominated by large parties and powerful interests, and perceived to be unfair.  MMP would improve our political system in each of these areas and should make voting more appealing to young, idealistic citizens.
  • The fact that MMP gives each voter the ability to vote for the best person and for the preferred party is a significant benefit and inducement to participate in the political process.  Presently many voters are faced with the prospect of supporting a poor candidate from a party with good policies, or a poor party which happens to offer the best candidate.
  • For decades electoral reformers have attempted to impose political donation limits and restrictions on donations by powerful corporations and organizations.  The ability of individuals or organizations to gain undue influence over elections and governments through their wealth has been a serious flaw in our political system.  MMPR should make it easier for such reforms to succeed because the minority governments which would become the norm are less attractive to those who would seek to influence them.  Moreover, minority governments are more likely to respond to the public’s wish to impose such reforms because they have less to lose.
  • MMP list candidates who are declared elected would not be tied to individual ridings, so they would be free to tour the province and offer improved representation to citizens whose local MLA happens to be less helpful because he/she belongs to an opposing political party.  This is potentially a very important benefit because we have seen numerous cases of MLAs and MPs who have neglected constituents who support other parties.  Moreover, many citizens undoubtedly do without the services of their MLA because they disagree with his/her party or policies.  List MLAs could also valuably serve ridings which happen to have underachieving local MLAs.
  • Setting a threshold—say, 5% of the province-wide vote—for party eligibility to elect list MLAs has been suggested, based on the practice of MMP in other parts of the world.  This deviation from democratic principle may be prompted by fear of small, radical political parties.  But in the interest of fairness and democracy, I would propose that no arbitrary threshold be set—rather, that each list candidate represent the largest number of province-wide votes.  Since the number of list candidates will be limited, a de facto threshold will be created that is not arbitrary or undemocratic.
The advantages listed above for MMPR are generally unique to that electoral system.  I would now like to compare MMP to other electoral reform proposals:  multi-round election systems, multi-member ridings, and the STV system.

Multi-round elections can be used to eliminate less popular candidates until one receives a majority vote, or to separately elect the head of state and legislature.  Although this system might improve the public’s perception of fairness in elections, it does not remedy the disenfranchisement of voters or the artificial amplification of electoral victory margins. 

Multi-member ridings could add a degree of proportionality to the composition of the legislature but the enormous ridings required in rural areas would increase inequity between urban and rural voters and lump together communities that have very little in common.  Moreover, a significant number of voters would continue to be disenfranchised because they support candidates who are not elected in these super-ridings.

The STV system specifies multi-member ridings and typically sets a threshold of about 20% for any candidate to remain in contention.  Supporters of any candidate receiving less than the threshold level of votes would remain disenfranchised.  Although STV could somewhat improve the proportionality of election results, it suffers from all the problems of multi-member ridings.

MMP has been criticized for requiring ridings to increase in size (on the assumption that the number of seats in the legislature would remain unchanged).  To avoid increasing the disadvantage rural voters already experience relative to urban voters, it would be preferable to add sufficient list seats (an additional 30% to 50% might be required) to allow proportionality in the composition of the legislature.  However, since expansion of the legislature is outside the Citizens’ Assembly terms of reference, an increase of about 50% in the size of ridings should be considered at this time.  Such an increase in riding size would have less impact and generate less inequality between urban and rural voters than would multi-member ridings or STV systems. 

MMP may threaten the interests of some powerful individuals and institutions—including political parties—by requiring governments to form coalitions and reducing their power to act arrogantly and without accountability between elections.  Insofar as the guiding principle of electoral reform is the broad public interest, however, this can only be a desirable outcome.

To summarize, MMP offers the best solution to the failings of the FPTP electoral system and can be expected to yield numerous social and political advantages and benefits.

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