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Submission GIZA-0199 (Scanned document)

Submission By R M Giza
AddressSechelt, BC,
Organization
Date20040416
CategoryElectoral system change
Abstract
A Proposal for Electoral Reform: The simple plurality vote is retained but with improved proportionality of seats achieved by adding a variable number of regionally based members allocated by the use of thresholds. [6 pages]

Submission Content
 [Note: The format of the specimen ballot could not be duplicated exactly in this scanned document]

Proposal For Electoral Reform

In recent years a number of provinces in Canada have undertaken reviews of their electoral system. Elections in Canada have often resulted with one party dominating the elected body with considerably less than 50% of the vote while other parties with a significant vote percentage can have few or no representatives. A major stumbling block has been the reconciliation of the election of area (riding) representatives on a plurality basis (largest vote even if less than 50%) and the overall popular vote.

Canada is one of the few democracies which has not done anything to improve this situation. Other countries have implemented a variety of corrective techniques such as ranking of candidates; the use of party lists; multiple voting rounds; and multi-member ridings. These are all attempts to improve proportional representation. A problem with any adjustment is that the closer you get to true proportional representation the less the likelihood of electing a majority government (where there are greater than two parties).

This proposal is a simple method for improving this situation. It incorporates the features of electoral systems which are generally recognized as desirable but in addition incorporates a number of unique improvements. The election of individual riding representatives on a simple plurality vote is retained. Improved proportionality of seats awarded is achieved by adding members on a regional basis as defined in the rules below. The unique features of this system are : the number of proportionally-based regional members is not fixed but rather is self-adjusting based on the need to improve representation as determined by the vote; independent candidates have the same opportunities as party candidates to be elected on a riding or regional basis; and voters always decide all members elected in a single vote - not subject to party-lists or complex multi-candidate voting.

RULES:

1.    All candidates to the elected body have two ways of being elected:

      i)   by attaining the largest vote in the riding on a plurality basis; or
      ii)  by attaining a designated threshold-percentage of the vote in a region.

2.    A region is a geographic-sociological grouping of ridings.

3.    The threshold-percentage vote designated to determine a region-based seat is generally based  on the true proportion of the vote that the seat would represent in the region. This figure can  be adjusted by legislators to impact the number of region-based seats awarded and the test for smaller party success.

4.   Greater than one party-representative by region-based seat can be provided by designating multi-threshold levels. The choice of number of levels and their threshold-percentage(s) will determine how close the system is to true proportional representation. The closer to true proportional representation the greater the number of region-based seats and the less the likelihood of majority government.

 5.   Large differences in relative size of regions (# of ridings) can be compensated for by varying either the number of threshold-levels by region or by varying both the number of threshold-levels and their corresponding percentage-vote by region.  (See elaboration of this procedure, below)

 6.   All candidates have a declared home-riding and their name and party affiliation appears on   the ballot in their riding. Independent-candidate names appear not only in their home-riding but on the ballot of all other ridings in their region (in these non-home ridings they are identified as region-based candidates). A riding victory takes precedence over a region-based victory on the percentage-threshold basis (where a candidate has attained both).

 7.   If a party has no candidate in a particular riding, the party name still appears on the ballot. As in the case of independents, the party in this riding is identified as being a region-based entry.   For the party to appear on the ballot, however, there must be at least one party-candidate running in the region.

 8.   Where a party achieves a successful threshold-percentage vote in the region the Seat(s) awarded is(are) to the party-candidate(s) with the greatest number of votes from among  ellow party-candidates in the region who have not won a riding-based seat.

 9.   Award of seats on a region-basis is compensatory. No seat is awarded if the party has achieved the corresponding threshold-level representation through regular riding victories.

 10. A partial double-ballot is required for this system. Since a party without a candidate would appear on the ballot as well as independent-candidates from other ridings in the region - it is possible that one of these might attain the largest vote. To resolve this problem a secondary part of the ballot allows voters who have chosen a region-based candidate to place a provisional vote for a home-riding candidate. If this situation occurs these provisional votes would be added to the other home-riding candidate votes to determine the riding victor. This ballot obviates the need of a run-off election.
  
SUGGESTED BALLOT

Primary Ballot

CANDIDATE                        PARTY

1. Marlon Brando                 Theta

2. Claudia Schiffer               Zeta

3. Paul Newman                  Gamma

4. Robert Redford                Epsilon

5. Naomi Campbell               Chi

6. Pamela Anderson             n/a  

7. M@L (member at large)    Omega   (Party has no riding candidate)

8. Sean Connery M@L   (Independent candidate running in another riding of region)

9. Cameron Diaz M@L    (Independent candidate running in another riding of region)

10. Clint Eastwood M@L  (Independent candidate running in another riding of region)

Secondary Ballot

If you have voted for a M@L candidate in the primary ballot, you may make a provisional vote for a home-riding candidate.

Provisionally vote for a home-riding candidate here: 1  2    3    4    5    6

The secondary ballot will only be tallied when a M@L candidate has received the largest vote in the primary ballot.
     

ADVANTAGES OF THIS PROPOSAL:

1.   The double knock-out provision gives all candidates a second opportunity for success (not just party-elites on a list). In closely fought contests between two strong candidates -- both may be successful -- one as the riding victor; the other as a regional representative.

2.   The award of extra seats in the fashion proposed remedies serious deficiencies in proportional representation as they occur. It’s regional basis is important -- most, if not all, jurisdictions are composed of distinctive regions from a geographic-sociological perspective which can be defined as groups of ridings. If regions are well designed this system ensures these distinctive regional views are always represented in the elected body.

 3.  Independent candidates have a realistic chance of success on the threshold-percentage basis. Such candidates have the opportunity to campaign throughout their region and develop a recognized presence with their electorate. These voices free of party discipline are desirable. In turn, this improved opportunity of success as an independent would help to loosen-up party discipline.

 4.  Smaller parties have an enhanced opportunity for success under this system. This gives these small parties a chance to get started; to learn the ropes; and demonstrate their worth to the electorate -- if any.

 5.  The fact that the number of regional based seats is not fixed allows the system to reflect voters wishes in an effective manner. Regional based seats are awarded only when there is a serious deficit of party representation -- not just to fill an arbitrary quota of seats even when a party may already be well represented. In addition, because the number of extra seats is not fixed, candidates are judged on an independent test of voter support -- rather than a confusing proportional test relative to other candidate support.

6.  Voters always determine the individuals elected without being subjected to undemocratic party-lists of people selected for special consideration.

7.  The capacity of this system to provide riding representatives as well as proportionally-based regional representatives all with a single vote is important. Other systems involve multi-candidate selection processes. Every vote cast beyond the first is progressively less meaningful to the voter (but just as important to the candidates). In addition, multi-candidate systems often involve intra-party competition for the same electorate -- this system does not.

 8.  Improved voter participation can be expected as the voter has greater opportunity to elect his choice of candidate or party through either a riding plurality basis or on a regional percentage-vote basis. The election is more meaningful to all voters.

 9.  Clarity and simplicity. Other ‘mixed proportional’ electoral systems elect additional members to improve proportionality by undertaking complex proportional vote, calculations after all the votes are tallied - the electorate and candidates are left hanging while this ‘mathematical lottery’ is completed. Unfortunately, since elected members cannot be halved or quartered you still get a result which is an approximate of proportionality. This system in effect completes these calculations before the election and sets clear and easily understood percentage targets and number of possible additional members by region. The electorate, parties, and candidates can readily judge their own circumstances before the election, while votes are tallied, and immediately at the completion of election returns.

 10.  Systems similar to this have been criticized for creating two classes of representatives. This criticism is inappropriate for this system. The election of a regional based representative is realized when in fact there is a deficit of representation of this regional view -- the member represents exactly what he pr she is -- the view of a given percentage of voters in the region. The riding representative represents his or her riding because he or she has attained the largest vote in the riding. Both have equal voting rights in the elected body and both have good reason to be there.      
   
ELABORATION OF RULE 5 : Adjustment For Regions Differing In Size.

Awarding extra seats as described to regions where parties are under-represented is proportionally correct when regions are all of similar size (# of ridings). A problem arises when they are not -- as an additional seat would be proportionally more significant to a smaller region than a larger one. In this proposal, legislators may solve this problem in two possible ways -- by varying the number of threshold-levels corresponding to the size of the region or by varying both the number of threshold-levels and their designated percentage-vote by region. These two options are discussed below with the use of two examples of region design.

Example

1.  Consider a jurisdiction with 100 ridings with 5 regions of 20 ridings each.

Legislators may choose to add 4 threshold levels to improve proportional representation. Since one additional seat in 20 is about 5% proportionally of the region -- therefore 5% may be a logical choice for the primary threshold level. If a party attains 5.0% or more of the regional vote a seat is awarded. The remaining 3 threshold levels may be designated: 12%, 18%, and 24% of the regional vote. Parties would be awarded 2, 3, or 4 seats in the region if they attained these vote-percentages and had not attained these seats in normal riding-based success. The percentage test is made a little higher since the party has already achieved a voice in the region with the first seat and perfect proportionality is not the goal. At 24% of the regional vote a party would be assured about 16% of the seats.

When applied to actual electoral results indications are that with this process the number of extra seats awarded in most cases would be equal to the aggregate of the number of regional levels designated ±. 50%. In this example there would be 20 ± 10 additional seats or 17% ± 8%of the total seats in the elected body. The number of additional seats is entirely voter-driven and depends on many factors including the number of credible smaller parties and the uniformity of larger party support among regions.

Example

2. : Consider a jurisdiction of 100 ridings and 7 regions broken down as follows:

   #Ridings: 5    9    11    15   16    19    25   (Total: 100)

Legislators may choose to add 1 to 5 threshold-levels by region as follows

   #Levels: 1    2     2     3    3     4     5

The smallest region would get one threshold-level and the largest would get five. In other words the smallest region could attain one additional seat by party and the largest region five possible additional seats by party. This is the best arrangement that can be made to proportionally designate the five threshold levels among these regions.

There are now two ways to assign the corresponding percentage-vote for these threshold-levels

1.  One way is to vary the percentage(s) by region to account for the difference in proportion that an additional seat would represent in the region. The resultant assigned percentages for this example would be as follows:

       #Levels   Threshold-Percentages
          1              17%
          2            8%  15%
          3         6% 11% 16%
          4      5% 10% 14% 17%
          5    4% 7% 11% 14% 17%

This arrangement is the best proportional fit of each additional member in relation to the size of region. However, with this method smaller regions require a higher percentage vote to attain representation.

2. A second and perhaps superior way of dealing with unequal size regions is to vary the number of threshold-levels but retain the same percentage test for each level regardless of the size of regions. Accordingly, the threshold percentages selected for these five levels may be as follows:

    6% 12% 18% 24% 30%.

The average size of the 7 regions is 14.3 ridings so one additional seat represents 6.5% of the representation on average - 6% therefore may be a logical choice for the first threshold-level. The remaining percentage levels are chosen for clarity and simplicity even though there is a small decrease in proportional representation as the level gets higher. Establishment of a threshold-level beyond 30% is approaching redundancy as there is a increasing likelihood that the additional seat would have been attained anyway in regular riding success.

Smaller regions gain an advantage with this method as they attain an additional seat with a lower number of votes than a larger region. However this can be justified for two reasons - it is fairer to have representation triggered by the same percentage-vote regardless of the size of the region; and secondly, this is a relatively small counter-balance to the “tyranny of the majority” of larger regions which are always going to have the greater number of seats in any event.

Again with this second region design the aggregate of threshold levels is 20 so the anticipated additional seats in the elected body would be 20 ± 10. 

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