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Submission CRANE-0475 (Online)

Submission By Bob Crane
AddressVictoria, BC,
Organization
Date20040525
CategoryElectoral system change
Abstract
I favour MMP with half the members elected in single-member ridings by a plurality system, and the other half by an at-large proportional representation list system to correct for distortions in party representation. [3 pages]

Submission Content
 

I am in favour of a mixed electoral system that would combine single-member constituencies, having representatives elected on a plurality system, with an at-large proportional representation list system to correct for distortions in party representation in the Legislature [MMP].

Voter participation and representation of views

I believe that a PR system will encourage wider voter participation.  Many of those holding minority views know their candidate cannot get elected and see no point in voting.  A PR system would allow a wider spectrum of views to be represented in the Legislature and, at times, representatives from minor parties can have real influence on government policy in forming coalition governments or making deals for their support on individual votes.

Party agendas

A PR system will make it more difficult for parties to win a majority of the seats because it is unusual for a party to get more than 50% of the vote.  As the parties come to appreciate this, I expect that it will have a moderating effect on the positions they take on issues.  They will need the support of other parties to implement their programs, rather than being given a 4-year mandate to implement any policies they want regardless of whether or not they were articulated in their election platforms.

Although a PR system should accommodate minority views, there need to be checks so that small minorities are not able to impede measures favored by larger pluralities or to dictate extremist terms as conditions of supporting larger parties.  I therefore support a minimum threshold percentage of the overall popular vote to be required for a party’s votes to be translated into seats.  A 5% threshold has been suggested; I defer to those who have studied this in greater detail.

Stability

There is some valid criticism of PR that it produces unstable governments.  At first I expect that the parties will continue to behave opportunistically and may precipitate elections when they think they can win them.  Over time, though, they will learn that overall majorities are difficult to achieve and that, even if they win a plurality of votes, they will still have to compromise with other parties to accede to and remain in power.  The current legislation setting a 4-year term would prevent governments from directly calling elections at their convenience, although they will still be able to deliberately lose votes of confidence.  Smaller parties may trigger elections by withdrawing their support of the governing parties, but they will have to be careful not to antagonize the electorate by using this power for frivolous or opportunistic reasons.  Overall, I expect that we will have elections more frequently under PR, a prospect that is not desirable but outweighed by the benefits of more democratic representation.

Mixed plurality/PR compared with other voting systems

I favour the mixed electoral system adopted in New Zealand, giving voters one vote for a constituency representative and one for a party representative.  Direct accountability to a group of constituents is a cornerstone of representative democracy.  Constituents should have access to a legislator who will work for them and represent the needs and views of their region.  These could continue to be elected under the current plurality system.  Parties would also submit lists of candidates, allowing voters to indicate their preferences from among the candidates the parties put forward.  Following the election of the constituency representatives, the party list candidates receiving the most votes would be assigned legislative seats in order to bring about party representation in the Legislature in approximate proportion to their popular vote.  Candidates should be able to run for both constituency and party seats, but if they win a constituency, would be eliminated from the list vote. 

I favour the proposal originally advocated by the Green Party, dividing the Legislature’s seats 50/50 between constituency representatives and those elected from party lists.  I do not support the Greens’ recent adjustment to 67 constituency/33 party list, which speaks to rural concerns about constituency size.  While the goal of accommodating these concerns is valid, the proposed system could realistically result in an undesirable outcome.  It would be possible for one party to win almost all of the constituencies with 50% or less of the popular vote.  That party would form a majority government and there would not be enough seats reserved for party lists to sufficiently correct representation to reflect, or even reasonably approximate the popular vote.

The present plurality system delivers results that do not reflect the will of the electorate most of the time.  Governments seldom achieve 50% of the vote, which means the majority of voters have actually voted against the government that is elected.  The 1996 and 2001 provincial elections illustrate the faults of this system, allowing one party to form a government with fewer votes than its opponent, and another party to win almost every seat with just over half of the total votes.

A majority system would do little to widen the spectrum of views represented in the Legislature.  It is true that voters would be given a chance to indicate a fall-back position if their first choice fails to receive a majority.  However, it would leave many voters’ first choice unrepresented.  A second choice will often be a very reluctant one, and some voters may drop out of the process if there is not a second option with which they feel they could support.  While larger parties may have to cater to parts of the platforms of smaller parties to attract their voters, the larger parties would often be reluctant or superficial representatives of views not originating from within.

I do not favour the single transferable vote system of proportional representation because I do not feel it effectively represents constituencies.  Members from different parties are likely to work at cross-purposes on local issues, and there may be duplication of effort and turf wars among representatives in the same constituency.  Constituencies would also have to be overly large to deliver a representative vote among several parties.  The Citizens’ Assembly fact sheet notes that a substantial reduction in proportionality occurs when the number of seats per district drops below 5 if there is a large number of parties.  To maintain a legislature of the same size, we would have to increase the constituency size by 5.  I do not feel British Columbians would be well served by huge constituencies with multiple representatives of different parties.

A pure PR list system would also require larger constituencies in order to adequately reflect proportionality.  A hybrid of the plurality and list systems would deliver both effective representation at the constituency level and proportionality at the provincial level.
 
How the question is asked

One of my biggest concerns about the referendum to be put to voters in 2005 is the way in which the question will be asked.  There should be a clear two-choice question on whether the voter chooses to retain the current system of voting or a proportional representation system.  If the Citizens’ Assembly selects only one PR option for consideration, the result will be a fair representation of what the electorate wants. 

On the other hand, if the Assembly wishes to present us with a choice of PR systems, the ballot needs to be carefully structured.  The question should be put in two parts.  First, there should be a question asking whether the voter favors the present system or a form of PR.  The second question would then ask what type of PR system they would favor if a majority answers ‘yes’ to the first question.  This gives those who may oppose a change a say in the type of PR system that is adopted, along with the majority who support a change.  The second question should be structured to achieve the highest degree of consensus possible, either by restricting it to two choices so that one receives a majority, or allowing for marking multiple choices in order of preference.  The requirement of 60% support in all constituencies should apply to the first question, which would clearly indicate a will for or against PR.  Once the general will of the electorate has been established with the first question, the second question should require only a plurality.

It is critical to avoid a question that mixes a choice for or against PR with a vote on the type of PR system desired, such as a ballot giving these choices:

     Current system
     PR option 1
     PR option 2

This will split the pro-PR vote, making achievement of a 60% majority unlikely.  It also does not give PR opponents the option of selecting a system that is least offensive to them if a majority favours change.

Thank you for giving British Columbians the opportunity to present their views on this very important political question.

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