A 79-seat MMP proposal featuring no party lists, no discrimination
against independents, recognition of regional diversity, a
representative relationship between MLAs and electors, and seats
for First Nations.
Designing a Mixed Member Proportional Representation
System to Express Canadian Constitutional Values
A Submission to
The Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform
From the B.C. Democratic Alliance
Submitted by Tom Morino, BCDA President and Interim Leader,
and Robert Allington, BCDA Policy and Communications Chair
The mandate of the Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform is to
assess models for electing members of the British Columbia
Legislative Assembly and recommend whether the current model for
these elections should be retained or another model should be
adopted which is consistent with the both the Constitution of
Canada and the Westminster parliamentary system. Mixed Member
Proportional (MMP) representation clearly is one option.
Sister nations of the Commonwealth, such as New Zealand, that share
a common Westminster parliamentary heritage, have adopted MMP. What
other nations, who honour the Crown, have done, could be applied to
Canada and British Columbia. This proposal, while it supports MMP,
does not propose to import a system identical with any other used
either within the Commonwealth, or within the broader community of
nations. Instead it draws upon the unique geographical, cultural
and social characteristics of British Columbia in search of a
balanced system of representative government. Like many other
proposals to the Citizens' Assembly it can be described as a
Made-in-BC solution, in this case from a registered British
Columbia political party. The proposal is the result of internal
party discussions that have sought to address voters' concerns
about various models of electoral reform under consideration before
the Assembly.
In accordance with the mandate of the Citizens' Assembly we have
taken into account the potential effects of the proposal on
government, the Legislative Assembly and political parties.
Similarly, we have attempted work within the existing parameters of
a 79-seat Legislature, and we have limited ourselves primarily to
the manner by which voters' ballots may be translated into elected
members.
The preparation for this submission has attempted to take into
account the hundreds of presentations and numerous online
submissions to your Assembly, and like the Assembly itself to
determine what values should be expressed by the British Columbia
electoral system. The Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform has
selected nine proposals from the many received for presentation to
the Full Assembly in September. Please consider the following as an
additional option, which acknowledges not only the strengths of
some of the presentations you will consider in Full Assembly, but
also, we believe, addresses some of the perceived problems. You
will in September consider various choices including: the
Alternative Vote (AV) system, Single Transferable Vote (STV), Mixed
Member Proportional Representation based on Party Lists, or
potentially retaining the current Single Member Plurality (SMP)
system.
Like Bruce Halsor, National Vice-President of non-partisan
organization Fair Vote Canada, members of the BCDA policy committee
agree that MMP, if designed correctly, can achieve the goals
identified by that organization and others as desirable. These
include broad proportionality, extended voter choice, regional
representation, and equality of votes. Mr. Halsor is expected to be
one of your September Full Assembly presenters, as is Tom Hoenisch,
a proponent of MMP. Mr. Hoenisch's proposal forecasts a 72-seat
Legislature, comprising 36 first-past-the-post SMP seats, and 36 PR
seats elected from party lists, a discriminatory five percent
threshold designed to exclude minority opinion, and a twin-voteone
for the party and one for the candidate. We believe another model
of MMP may better address the values that should characterize
voting in the province.
Another presenter, who will appear before the Full Assembly in
September, is Nick Loenen. Mr. Loenen proposes what he describes as
a Preferential Plus (PP), a mixed STV/AV approach which creates two
classes of voters, in 14 STV multi-seat and 9 northern AV
single-seat ridings. In nine northern ridings, AV would manufacture
majority seats through a system similar to that used in British
Columbia in the 1950s, while elsewhere STV would allow voters to
rank candidates within parties, and candidates among parties. PP
would extend voter choice for some voters, but falls short of
meeting other appropriate goals of electoral reform, including
broad proportionality, transparency and equality of votes.
Notably, Mr. Loenen correctly identifies the dilemma of party list
systems of proportional representation which tend to empower
parties rather than people and he emphasizes, as have other
submissions to the Assembly, the need to maintain a geographical
link between MLAs and their constituents. The BCDA MMP proposal
addresses both of these problems by eliminating party lists and
creating regional electoral districts in which candidates would
compete for available PR seats.
Designing a Mixed Member Proportional representation system
appropriate to British Columbia is a question of balancing values
to create a system, which is sufficiently transparent to be easily
understood by everyone. The values to be considered include:
equality before the law, the reasonable expectation that voter
preferences will be translated into a stable and effective
government, meaningful choices that ensure every vote counts,
acknowledgement of regional diversity and recognition of the
importance of the traditional relationship between the elector and
his MLA. Most importantly, these goals must be accomplished while
bearing in mind the values expressed by the Canadian Constitution
and its Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR VOTERS
The BCDA cherishes the democratic rights expressed by the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, which provide every citizen of Canada with
the right to vote in an election for members of the House of
Commons, or of a Legislative Assembly, and to be qualified for
membership therein. As a political party, we also value the
equality rights of the Charter, which guarantee each of us equality
before the law and equal protection and benefit of the law.
The dilemma for the Canadian electorate in general, and for British
Columbians in particular, is that although we may all be equal in
our right to vote, none of us is equal in our right to have our
views, or those of like-minded persons, expressed in the
Legislature. Our Single Member Plurality system, and the electoral
laws that enable it, may give each of us the right to vote, but
they do not extend to every citizen what should be a fundamental
benefit of those laws.
Framed in terms of the section 15(2) of Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, electoral reform may be seen as a kind of affirmative
action program for voters, a change that has as its object the
amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups.
The inequalities of the current electoral system are especially
apparent in the results of the 2001 British Columbia elections. The
governing Liberal party with 56.45 percent of the popular vote
received 77 of the 79 available seats, and has acknowledged no
official opposition. The New Democratic Party with 21.56 percent
received only two seats, while others such as the Green Party, with
substantial support in the populace, have no representation. These
latter political groups and their individual supporters are clearly
disadvantaged, effectively disenfranchised, by the current
electoral system, and are worthy of some ameliorative action that
would ensure their equality before the law.
Among the nine anticipated September presentations only one, that
prepared by Dr. Julian West, addresses another fundamental inequity
within the current processthe under-representation of First
Nations. In accordance with the recommendations of Lortie
Commission (1991) and the Law Commission of Canada (2004), the
British Columbia Democratic Alliance recommends that the Citizens'
Assembly on Electoral Reform include First Nations representation
in any proposal for electoral change. The historical
disenfranchisement of First Nations has today been replaced by a
system of electoral districts in which First Nations, because they
are dispersed within the broader population, are effectively
discriminated against based upon national origin. This is clearly
inappropriate in the context of the contemporary Canadian
Constitutional framework.
Dr. West proposes three First Nations seats, based on the Lortie
Commission recommendation of one First Nation representative for
each quotient equal to 85 percent of the provincial quotient, and
his assumption that 75 percent of the estimated 170,000 First
Nations voters would opt to vote on First Nations' rolls. The
current provincial quota is slightly under 50,000 (obtained by
dividing the 2001 census population by the number of districts,
79). Since the Fisher decision on provincial boundaries allows a
deviation of 25% from the provincial quota, Dr. West's conclusion
of three seats is far from clear. An appropriate quota may be as
many as four seats. Despite our reservations, for the purposes of
modeling this proposal, we have used Dr. West's estimate.
Similarly, Dr. West's simple division of First Nations into
Southern, Northern and Urban categories, may not accurately reflect
the cultural realities of the First Nations population which
includes more than two dozen language groups and significant
national diversity. For these reasons, any recommendation for
including First Nations' representation should include the proviso
that a determination of any electoral boundaries should be achieved
by and with the consent of First Nations. Notwithstanding the
concerns expressed, achieving electoral reform that would include a
place for First Nations people in the debates of the Legislature
would help to raise public awareness of First Nations issues and
encourage a fully participatory democracy, which acknowledges the
dignity and inherent worth of all citizens.
THE B.C. DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE PROPOSAL
Whatever system the Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform may
recommend, if the voters of British Columbia by referendum vote to
accept a new method of electing the Legislative Assembly, the B.C.
Democratic Alliance will work to ensure subsequent Legislation
reflects the wishes of the electorate. The following proposal
however is one approach that expresses the values that appear to be
appropriate to electoral reform and that we believe are consistent
with the Citizens' Assembly mandate.
1. A 79-SEAT LEGISLATURE. Although the adoption of a
new method of translating voters' ballots into elected members may
necessitate a redistribution of electoral boundaries, working with
a model which envisions a Legislature of the same magnitude as the
existing House avoids the perception that the Citizens' Assembly
may have exceeded its mandate.
2. 48-SEATS ELECTED BY SINGLE MEMBER PLURALITY48 seats
comprising 60.76% of those available in the existing Legislature
are sufficient in most cases to ensure a viable government. As many
presenters and submissions to the Citizens' Assembly have observed,
some proportional systems tend to create pizza parliaments, which
are inherently unstable and unable to govern effectively.
As Dr. Julian West has noted MMP systems which set aside fewer
than 33 percent of the seats for proportional representation would
not have corrected the problems of the last two elections. This was
confirmed by our own modeling of election results for 1996, and in
2001.
As we observed earlier in this presentation, creating an MMP
representation system for British Columbia is a question of
balancing values. Alternative Vote (AV) approaches, such as that
proposed by Arpal Dosanjh (another presenter who will appear before
the Full Assembly) tend to overemphasize the value of majority
support, at the expensive of equality, broad proportionality and
acknowledgement of minority opinion. STV (as proposed by Dr. West)
and combined the STV/AV (proposed by Loenen) tend to overemphasize
enhanced choice over other values such as accessibility and
transparency and real proportionality.
The BCDA proposal places sufficient emphasis on SMP seats to
encourage stability and maintain the traditional relationship
between MLAs and their SMP electorate, and through a system of
regional PR representation creates the same relationship for PR
MLAs . At the same time, we avoid the discriminatory thresholds and
party lists inherent in the Hoenisch MMP plan. We also enhance
voter preference, since one vote may contribute not only to the
election of a SMP candidate, but also to regional and provincial PR
candidates without discrimination against independents and minority
parties.
3. 31 SEATS ELECTED BY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTION.
Proportional Representation for the purposes of this proposal would
reflect both the percentage of the vote achieved by a candidate and
his or her party (if any), and in the case of First Nations
candidates, their constituencies' percentage of the aggregate
provincial population. Of the 31 seats available proportionally, 24
would be regional and 7 provincial. For the purposes of electing
regional PR representatives, 6 Regional Electoral Districts would
be created. A probable geographical distribution could provide a
Northern Regional District, one for the East, one for Vancouver
Island, and three for the Lower Mainland.
This approach addresses the concerns of Chris Morey, who spoke
on behalf of northern voters at the Fort Nelson Public Hearings,
and who will make a presentation to the Full Assembly. With a
strong component of Single Member Plurality seats, and Regional
Proportional Representation based on electoral legitimacy, northern
voters need not be concerned that they will be outvoted,
outnumbered and not counted, as Mr. Morey expressed it.
Indeed access to MLAs who share the voters' experience with
remote areas of the province may actually be enhanced. If the local
first-past-post representative is unresponsive to a voter's
interest, the regional PR-rep from an opposing political
perspective will likely be more receptive. Given the territorial
vastness and sparse population of the north-central part of the
province, Dr. Julian West's proposal for assigning MLAs
responsibilities in circuits within a regional district has merit,
and could be adapted for this MMP proposal. Another approach to
recognize the special geographical circumstances of the north might
be to define sub-regions within the northern Regional Electoral
District based on the principle of one regional PR-seat being
available for every two SMP seats.
The BCDA proposal also addresses the concerns of former Social
Credit MLA Jim Nielsen, a proponent of retaining the current
electoral system and a strong critic of PR, who like others will
appear before the Full Assembly in September.
"The idea of a person becoming an MLA because their name is on a
political list without benefit of direct endorsement by the
electorate is appalling in our system, Mr. Nielsen told the public
hearing in Kelowna. We agree! We do not believe in backdoor MLAs,
as Mr. Nielson so aptly described list-appointed PR
representatives. That is why the BCDA proposal incorporates neither
closed nor open party lists.
4. NO PARTY LISTS: To qualify for a PR-seat, under this
proposal, a candidate must have sought election as a Single Member
Plurality candidate. As Katherine Gordon, another of the nine
presenters who will appear before the Full Assembly has observed
from her experience in New Zealand, party lists tend to create
numerous technical and perceptual problems. MLAs selected from
party lists can be seen as second class members, who represent no
particular constituency except their party. When, as a matter of
conscience, a member decides to sever his or her connection with
their party and sit as an independent, that member no longer has
electoral legitimacy. The BCDA proposal addresses both of these
problems. By eliminating party lists, we also remove the
possibility that a closed list system will ensure safe seats to a
party elite.
Since proportional seats would be gained on the basis of a
candidate's and/or his/her party's performance in
first-past-the-post contests, the MLA has electoral legitimacy and
a formal regional constituency. While Ms. Gordon addresses the some
of the problems of MMP as implemented in New Zealand, as a
proponent of MMP she also presents a strong argument for its
benefits. Among the benefits she identifies are the enhancement of
political debate both on the floor of the Legislature and in the
standing committees, where not just one voice, but many are heard,
all of them working to keep each other honest, open to compromise
and receptive to innovation.
We also acknowledge the insights of Ian McKinnon, who like
Katherine Gordon will be among the 9 presenters to the Full
Assembly, particularly for his observations regarding party lists,
which remove control of nomination processes from constituencies
and voters. Mr. McKinnon is a supporter of the PR-Light proposal
prepared by Prof. Bryon Schwartz. Prof. Schwartz' proposal
recommends a 15-20 percent proportional representation component.
This is insufficient, in our opinion, to adequately address the
inequalities inherent in the contemporary Single Member Plurality
system. With 39.24 percent of the seats available for PR
representatives, we seek to balance the desirable goal of broad
proportionality with the equally desirable objective of stable
government, without abandoning a representative relationship
between the voter and the MLA.
5. ONE VOTE: Electors would vote as they do today for the candidate
and concurrently, if the candidate is not an independent, for the
party of their choice. Retaining the current system of voting
ensures clarity and comprehensibility to every voter. Both the
Loenen STV/AV proposal and the West STV proposals, feature
preferential ballots. The number of candidates, the lack of clarity
in defining the direct relationship between an MLA and the voter in
multi-member districts, and the number of choices make preferential
list systems almost as inappropriate as party list systems. Voters
should not need an instruction manual to mark a ballot. The West
and Loenen proposals enhance opportunities for expressing voter
preference. The BCDA proposal achieves the same objective, while
retaining the familiar contemporary ballot. One vote in a single
member plurality riding may result in the voter's preferred
candidate for that riding being elected either as SMP or PR
representative. Alternatively it may contribute to a PR candidate
of similar political persuasion, being elected as a PR candidate
within the voter's Regional Electoral District. Even a vote for an
independent candidate or a minority party member, who does not
qualify for SMP election, may result in that candidate, or another
of similar political persuasion, being elected from one of seven
available province-wide PR seats. This is a system which rewards
conscience rather than strategic voting, in which every vote may
count, and where no vote is truly wasted.
6. REGIONAL REPRESENTATION: For the purposes of translating ballots
cast into seats for elected members, the province would be divided
into 48 conventional SMP electoral districts, 6 regional PR
electoral districts comprising 4 PR seats and 8 single member
plurality seats each, and one-province-wide PR electoral district
comprising 7 seats.
The disposition of the 7 province-wide PR seats is described in
sections 7, 8 and 9 below. Here's how the proportional Regional
Electoral Districts would work. When the election results are
tabulated, first-past-the-post MLA's are elected in each of the 8
SMP constituencies in each of the 6 regional electoral
districts.
The totals are then taken for all the SMP ridings within a Regional
Electoral District. The four remaining Regional PR seats would
assigned to the party or parties that did not elect at least their
proportion of MLA's based on the total vote for the District up to
the maximum of four PR MLA's per Regional Electoral District.
Candidates would be elected in proportion to their party's share of
combined vote for the parties qualifying for top-up seats, and
their ranking in terms of electoral support.
In our policy roundtable we considered various models for
creating regional PR electoral districts including some which
increased the size of the Legislature and others like the Hoenisch
proposal which reduced the number of seats. At the same time we
attempted to predict what effect any given model would have had
upon the results of recent British Columbia elections. The latter
kind of reverse engineering is far from an exact science. Much
depends upon the electoral district boundaries that might emerge
from any redistribution, and the method of assigning the top-up
seats to achieve perceived proportionality. Several patterns
however emerged.
a. Electoral boundaries which transect
or concatenate the pockets of regional support for minor parties
such as BC Unity and Reform BC can either disproportionately reward
or penalize candidates.
b. MMP systems which set aside less
than 33 percent of available seats for PR, while more inclusive,
are insufficient to correct the significant disparity between voter
preferences and the actual results of recent BC elections.
c. Creating regional electoral
districts that provide only a minimal number of top-up PR seats
within a given district will tend to reward second-placed parties
at the expense of third and fourth-placed parties, thus overvaluing
the benefit of a united opposition. This could also be one effect
of special sub-districts in the north. From our evaluation, a total
of 6 regional electoral districts with 4 PR seats per district,
provided the best opportunity for creating a reasonably balanced
opposition within the context of a 79-seat legislature. The
addition of province-wide PR seats provides for a further
adjustment.
d. Apportioning seats based on a
party's share of the regionally determined percentage of the total
popular vote, rather than a party's share of the combined total of
the parties qualifying for PR seats as we propose, may also tend to
overcompensate second-placed parties to the disadvantage of third
and fourth-placed contenders.
e. Due to the effects of rounding-up in determining a party's fair
share of regional PR seats, various mathematical anomalies may
result in overcompensation of some parties to the disadvantage of
others when the results are compared with achieved percentages of
the total provincial popular vote. This observation, in particular,
persuaded us that some province-wide PR seats were essential.
7. PROPORTIONAL RECOGNITION OF INDEPENDENTS &
MINORITY PARTIES Under most MMP systems, independents and
candidates who represent parties which do not compete in all
ridings are inappropriately discriminated against. We propose that
one of the seven available province-wide PR seats should be
reserved for an independent or a person representing a party that
would otherwise not be represented in the legislature. The eligible
candidate would be the individual who achieved the largest
percentage of the popular vote in all of the 48 SMP electoral
districts and who had not otherwise qualified for a seat, or whose
party was not otherwise represented in the legislature. In the six
regional electoral districts, candidates representing parties that
sought election in every riding who did not achieve a seat in the
SMP contest would have a second chance for election as a
proportional representative. This proposal would give independents
and minority parties a similar opportunity.
8. THREE PROVINCE-WIDE PR ADJUSTMENT SEATS. Three of
the 7 province-wide PR seats would be set aside, to provide for a
second round of proportional adjustment. This should be sufficient
to address the concerns that may emerge from electoral boundary
definitions, and the overcompensation of some parties arising from
regional rounding-up. Mathematical overcompensation of one
individual party is unlikely to be simultaneously repeated across
all 6 regional electoral districts.
9. PROPORTIONAL RECOGNITION OF FIRST NATIONS CITIZENS.
In recognition of the unique role that First Nations have within
the British Columbia cultural mosaic, we propose that seats be
reserved for First Nations candidates. Persons of First Nations
heritage would be guaranteed seats in a manner similar to that used
in New Zealand for persons of Maori heritage. The number of seats
available would be assigned in proportion to the First Nations
percentage of the total population, bearing in mind the usual
variations in electoral district magnitude permitted by provincial
legislation. The specific details of representation and electoral
boundaries would be negotiated and achieved with the consent of the
First Nations.
It may be that the ultimate resolution would provide for 3
Single Member Plurality seats for First Nations, or 2 SMP and 1 PR.
It is also entirely possible that First Nations may select a
non-partisan model of election, similar to Nunavut. The description
of these seats, as proportional in the context of this proposal,
appropriately refers to their proportionality in terms of the
population of the constituents when compared to the overall
provincial population. For the non-aboriginal population, PR seats
would constitute up to 40.76 percent of the Legislature, still
within the range to provide broad proportionality, yet ensure a
reasonably stable legislature. If First Nations' representatives
were regarded as part of the overall SMP quota, then PR seats would
constitute approximately 35 percent of the Legislature. In effect,
however, whatever their party affiliation (if any), First Nations
MLAs would probably function in some respects as an independent
(but not necessarily unified) partisan interest, similar to that of
a minor political party.
VISUALIZING THE REGIONAL ELECTORAL DISTRICTS
The physical redistribution of the electoral districts and the
actual configuration of regional electoral districts are beyond the
mandate of the Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform. But for the
purposes of visualizing how the regional districts might be
composed, the potential impact on the composition of the
legislature and the relationship between elected representatives
and the people, we present the following.
From the existing provincial map of British Columbia's Electoral
Districts published by Elections BC, certain natural district
affiliations emerge. Vancouver Island currently comprises 13 SMP
electoral districts. If we think of the province in terms of
similar 13 district accumulations, a second emerges quite naturally
from 13 electoral districts in the southeast of the province
beginning near the Alberta border. A similar grouping can be made
from the northern and central parts of the province, and the Lower
Mainland could be assembled into three regional electoral
districts. Six times 13 is 78, leaving one electoral district to
spare. Now imagine that a riding at the point of convergence is
more or less equally split among the districts. Thought of this way
you get something of a picture of the political balance of rural
and urban voters that might emerge from redistribution. Six
regional electoral districts, potentially one from the Island, 3
Lower Mainland, one eastern, and one northern. Other configurations
are possible, but this in one way of looking at it.
If Vancouver Island formerly had 13 representatives, after such
a re-distribution it would still have 12 representatives, and would
likely share at least one the 7 province-wide aboriginal,
proportional adjustment, independent or minority seats. Eight MLAs
within a regional electoral district would be elected by the
familiar SMP first-past-the-post system from individual ridings.
The SMP electoral districts would admittedly be somewhat larger
than those that currently exist. But the additional four regional
PR MLAs and any province-wide PR adjustment, independent or
minority seats would be assigned proportionally based on a
candidate's rank in the SMP election, and the ranking of his or her
party (if any).
Urban candidates from southern Vancouver Island would have no
particular advantage over rural PR candidates from the North
Island. Election for regional proportional seats would depend
entirely on the electoral performance of a given candidate and his
or her party (if any). As regional MLAs, these representatives
would represent all of Vancouver Island. An elector whose views
differ from those of his or her SMP representative could seek out a
regional representative with a shared political perspective.
All of the above should only enhance the potential for
meaningful debate, and create an embracing Legislature enriched by
the diversity of British Columbia life.
CONCLUSION
We make this submission in the spirit of representative democracy.
On behalf of the British Columbia Democratic Alliance, we
congratulate the members of the Citizens' Assembly on Electoral
Reform for the inclusive respect and dedication with which you have
addressed and continue to investigate the possibilities for
electoral change in our Province.
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