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[see also # 0341]

The multitude of reasons why the Citizens Assembly should reject the Mixed system/Additional member system.

No
to the
Mixed system

C.A. top values: prop rep, local rep, and choice
Assembly members identified several criteria to use as benchmarks. Their 'top three' are:

    _   *The extent to which electoral outcomes **reflected** votes cast (the issue of vote-seat relationships)*

    _   *The nature of the linkage between voters and their representatives (the character of **local** representation)*

    _   *The range and nature of **choice** offered to voters (issues ranging from the number and nature of competing parties to the form of the ballots)*

Because the Mixed system pays lip-service to 'local' representation, and its two ballots -- one for FPP and one for nation-wide pool -- appear to offer a 'choice', it can also be offered as a system that satisfies the C.A. criteria. It does nothing of the sort.

'choice'

includes PR, but also nature of parties: issue salience, single issue parties, extremists, schismatic-splinter

/ **ballots**/ STV/SNTV, open list, closed list, extreme PR mixed and non-mixed

Most versions of the Mixed system that have been proposed offer the *most* **closed ballot** of any system. Also, the presenter of the New Zealand system, Katherine Gordon, admitted that she was guilty of the most obvious flaw in the double ballot; voting for a different party on the national pool list.

In theory, when the closed ballot is used for Additional members, the representation of parties in the legislature is a very close 'reflection' of their voter support. However, because the pool is selected by the most closed form of ballot possible, voters are offered the *least* amount of '*choice*' of selecting who will represent their party in the pool.

To overcome this flaw, Germany and now New Zealand offer the voters a choice on a second ballot. However, there is nothing to say that the voter has to vote for the same party on the second ballot. The more voters there are who deviate from doing do, the less accurately the party representation in the legislature 'reflects' their support among voters (as revealed on the first ballot).

Practice:

It is a significantly widespread a phenomenon where voters have the mistaken impression that the German Mixed or additional member ballot they are filling out is a 'preferential' system. Not only this, but this 'second preference' is not believed to be of the STV or ATV one-person-one-vote variety. Rather, they think that they are *electing a separate second person*, along the lines of municipal at- large ballots. Based on this, voting patterns can resemble the bi-partisan **vote-splitting** found in US Presidential and Congressional elections and Canadian Federal and Provincial government elections, where voters vote **strategically** to create their own system of checks and balances. In the German Mixed ballot case, voters have inadvertently cast their one national vote (on their second ballot) for their second preference. Furthermore, as with BC in the early 1950's, where the Social Credit were everyone's 'second preference' (Liberals were supposed to vote second preference for Conservatives, and Conservative second for Liberals), some *vaguely known* minor party – the Greens for a lot of people in the 2004 federal election -- could win the election.

German political scientists report this phenomenon as widespread. As anecdotal evidence, Plenary session speaker Katherine Gordon admitted to using her second ballot to vote for a different party (in New Zealand) in every election. This is reported to be a common practice, not as a form of strategic voting, but usually by mistake, in Germany; i.e., it is not a 'simple' or 'transparent' ballot.

Theory:

What if everyone did it? For example, the Liberals in BC might receive 55 % of votes (using FPP) for the single member risings, and 70% of seats, while the NDP get 45% votes and 30% seats. If the national pool were allocated without a second ballot (with a closed ballot), the NDP would receive 60% of the 'additional member' seats, the Liberals 40%. Whereas, if there is a second ballot (to decrease 'closed' ballot), and everyone votes 'strategically', so that the Greens get 100% of the national pool, then the Greens (as much a protest vote as a second preference) would get 50% of the total seats, the Liberals 35% and the NDP 15%. Thus, there is no correlation between the national pool results 'mirroring' the people's 'choices', and the actual party support (reflected in the first-local ballot).

When it comes to 'choice', there is also the notion of the 'wasted vote', as defined by PR advocates. This would be any vote cast, that did not result in the person voted for getting a seat in parliament.

In one sense, when you switch to PR, most votes are no longer wasted, as all votes are allocated. In the German mixed 'additional member' system (and Denmark and Austria versions), there is a nation-wide allocation until all the seats in a district have been allotted. At this point, each party may have a couple of its percent of votes left over.

However, in another sense, in the case of the **German** Mixed system (not Denmark or Austria), for the person who voted for a local candidate, who won 1/3 of the vote and did not go to parliament to represent the people who voted for the candidate and not the party, they will still feel that their vote is wasted. In a case of 70% wasted vote in a riding using single seat FPP (45% votes, minus 30% needed to win = 15%, plus 55% of losing parties, = 70), still results in 55% of voters in this riding not being represented by the local candidate they cast a vote for. Considering that the entire rationale for adopting the Mixed system is to retain local geographic representation, this result where the majority of voters do not elect a local MP cannot be presented as a solution to the problem of the wasted vote.

[Nor does preferential voting with M1 (ATV, run-off) eliminate the spectre of the wasted vote, except as a form of legerdemain. For all practical purposes, unless your first preference is elected, you have wasted your vote.]

In addition, if the goal is for people to be represented by the *candidate* they vote for, as much as it is for the ideological party, then the Mixed system is less efficient or 'faithful' in having that party candidate elected. Using the Mixed formula advocated in Canada, a closed ballot, in the 2004 election nine or ten seats would be awarded to the Greens from a national (provincial) list, with none of the Green party MLAs having an official link to any local riding. Using the German system in BC in 2001, 1/4 of the additional member seats (e.g., 10 districts of 8 seats each, 4 chosen by FPP, 4 proportionally from lists), would be awarded to the Greens in every district. Thus where 2 Greens would have been chosen in some districts if M8 were used, and where the Greens had received 25% of the vote, while 0 Greens would have been chosen in other areas, under the Mixed system areas where the Greens have strong support, placing fourth, would have one Green MLA, while areas where Green support is non-existent would also have one Green MLA. One Green MLA could be representing over 200,000 voters, while another represented a hundred or less.

In summary, the Mixed system can be the most closed ballot of any, or it can offer a second ballot. In theory this second ballot can offer the voter a second choice, which the authorities intend to be a regional rep from the same party as the voter's selection of single member rep. In practice, not only can a voter select a different party, but even if they select someone from a party that is regionally concentrated in its support then they have wasted their vote. The losers on the first ballot have still wasted their vote, and the voters whose party won on the first ballot (see 'local rep' below) have wasted their vote on the second ballot.

'Local rep'

C.A. Statement includes: *and (FPP) provides a mechanism for voters to hold representatives directly accountable for their actions. All MLAs have equal standing in the legislature and share common obligations and relationships to the electorate.*

The Mixed system obviously fails this criteria on all counts. The MLAs in the national pool are not at all directly accountable, and they make up two 'classes' of MLAs.

The Assembly is aware that British Columbians in rural areas, and in locations far removed from the heavily populated Lower Mainland region, feel especially strongly that they must struggle to have their concerns heard. It is sensitive to the reality that for them, a vigorous system of local representation remains a highly valued dimension of their political life.

The Mixed system would result in the doubling in size of current ridings. Is that still sufficient to meet the above needs of non-GVRD citizens?

Theory

The smaller the electoral district, the more that the public is represented geographically; and regional disparities tend to be less virulent than ethnic or ideological enmities. That is, if we want stability, we may well want geographic representation as much or more than we want ethnic or economic ideology groups represented. However, even under these conditions, it may be desirable to use **an electoral system in which it is still possible to express regional concerns through parties, but proportional enough that more than one party is represented by that district**. While some PR systems may achieve this inadvertently, it is an express goal of Germany's 'mixed' system of large (provinces) and small districts, and Japan's single non-transferable vote (where parties must deliberately run only as many candidates as seats they think they can win. Since only about two candidates can run for a party in a five-seat district, and five will have tried to get on their party's list, it stands to reason that candidates with strong local ties will have an advantage).

Practice

Non-GVRD parts of BC will be unfairly and *needlessly* disadvantaged by either the German Mixed system (or the Irish STV system). Neither of these systems, in practice, allows for *variation* in the size of regional districts. Implementing the German system in BC would most likely result in 40 local seats and 40 additional member seats, meaning that local ridings would *double* in size. This is not problematic for people in the GVRD, where they might find their local MLA's office two miles away instead of one. However, in a point that is obvious to residents of non-GVRD parts of BC, people living in one regional centre of BC would find themselves without local representation, with the 'local' MLA residing in the regional centre of the riding to which their's was merged. Furthermore, merging two ridings could have the same effect that 'double' ridings (using at-large plurality, not proportionality) had in previous BC elections. These were designed, like gerrymandering, to advantage one party. e.g., an MLA from party A in one riding and from party B in the adjacent one. When the two districts are merged under the Mixed system, representation from one of the parties will be lost (it is the same rationale as Vcr. COPE wanting to switch to a 'ward' system from at-large).

People may think that their party representation is regained in the nation-wide pool; but the likeliness of who those national list people will be, is revealed by the experience of the national NDP, in its local MP's (the West) and its leadership (the East) throughout its forty year history. [Meanwhile, STV and SNTV in practice are limited in range to between M3 and M5.]

Systems that use 'List' PR, in practice, do allow for variation in the size of regional districts. However, there is no formula for deciding which ones get M1 and which get M20 or more. Instead, they go by existing administrative units, such as provinces, and calculate the number of MPs based on rep by pop. In BC, at the least, adopting this system would mean scrapping the existing 79 MLA districts. And as Chris Morey pointed out, the North would be a multi-seat district.

To me, the only *non-arbitrary* way to decide which electoral districts are merged, is to place **population density along a logarithmic scale**.

In order to preserve as much local representation as possible (knowing that all the vagaries of FPP disappear at M2, and complete PR is reached at M6), while achieving the goal of increased proportionality (the Greens goal being to have their seat total match their vote total).

I used a (base-10) formula that would produce 1-seat districts in the North (of the 51st parallel), and 5-6 seat districts in Vancouver (I demonstrate elsewhere that complete proportionality is reached by M6). There is no 'compromise' in the way of a 'trade-off' needed between those in the GVRD wishing for more 'choice' and proportionality, and those in other parts of the province concerned about local rep. Instead, it is mutually beneficial.

Most liberal democracies use list-PR, and most list-PR countries have one or more districts with M as low as M1 (and as high as double-digits). Only STV avoids them as a rule. So it appears to be o.k. to have M1 districts. However, we want to avoid the vagaries of extreme PR that these countries with districts higher than M6 have to deal with.

What I wanted to do, was achieve the complete PR that M6 provides, while still providing M1 in rural districts.

Regarding Green party fortunes, using either M5 or pop. density formulas, in the 2001 BC election, they would have received 15% of the seats with 12% of the votes -- a better result than with the Mixed pool.

A cause for concern for a liberal democracy would be where a large, mainstream and moderate group were permanently kept out of power (Canada has the most opposite result). There is no record of this ever happening in any country using FPP. Duverger's model claims that its happens to the Liberals (in BC and Britain), who are squeezed out of the middle, leaving a polarized political landscape. However, Down's model claims that these two parties of the Left and the Right move toward the centre and the Median Voter during an election campaign. There was a noticeable change in the late 1970's and early 80's, when the socialist Old Left became a victim of its own success (the Welfare State), or its economic (debt, inflation) and social (blue collar workers voting for right-wing populist parties) failures, and in reaction the rise of a 'neo-Liberal' or 'conservative' Right, and a New Left with conflicts with the Old Left (and new Right) on environmental and social issues.

With more than one salient issue (add social conservative 'family values' and single-issue environmentalist Greens), and the economic issue more polarized (libertarians on the right, Labour and Greens on the left), it is difficult to place an individual or groups in the 'median' position of policy space. Thus, if there is a cause for concern where a large, mainstream and moderate group is being kept permanently out of power, it would be those that are **regionally**

concentrated. In BC, in Canada, and the world generally, this would be **rural** areas and resource hinterlands.

If there is a feature of FPP that is unfair and also precipitates conflict-instability-centrifugal forces, it is the bias towards parties whose support is concentrated in the largest regions (this bias disappears with M2). The 'best' electoral system is therefore *not* one that aids minor parties with immoderate ideological policies (anti-system or divisive), but one that has been the most successful at **including the smaller regions** in cabinet (not including secessionist parties).

The retention of single-seat ridings by *Mixed systems exacerbates regional identities*, just as it does in countries that use single-seat systems only. However, small parties (in terms of national votes) with large regional concentration are severely disadvantaged by the adoption of the 'additional member' system, or any system of PR, unless they represent an ethnic minority (in which case they can form an ethnically-based party, that just happens to all live in the same neighborhood. It will then receive all the seats in that area no matter what the PR district magnitude is). The lower the PR, the more the system is based on geographical representation. Single seats the most, nation-wide PR the least. Systems with geographic representation make the citizenry more conscious of regional representation in the national legislature, and especially in the cabinet, where decisions are made on how to divide the pie. Systems with single seat ridings are therefore the least ideological, looking more towards between-regional (inter) economic or class conflict than within the region (intra) itself.

Meanwhile, the Mixed system allocates most of its 'additional member' seats to smaller ideological parties, parties that claim to be cross-regional, but operate internally by majority rule and choose their leader from the 'heartland' or 'core' region (e.g., in Canada, the NDP always has the majority of its MPs elected from the West, yet it has never had a single leader from the West, as Ontario uses its majority to elect their own. Note: Westerners did lead the preceding CCF). Now, regional conflict can be alleviated if the main party receiving the additional seats is one of the two main parties **(**that would have benefitted the most from non-PR electoral systems anyway, or at least M2, and can never be found advocating the Mixed system (Italy) or the non-partisan STV system (Ireland)**),** in which case it will increase its ability to claim to represent the whole country, and actually be doing so (this is only achieved through M2). However, it is members of immoderate third parties with low regional concentration (the NDP nationally in Canada and the Greens in BC) who can be heard shouting the loudest and the longest for Mixed (extreme) PR.

Thus, the Mixed system is designed more than any other to *favour small extreme parties* with either no regional base, or else a complete (ethnic, less than 5% of the total population) regional base, at the expense of parties with a plurality of support in most regions or small non-ethnic parties with a regional base (e.g. in rural ridings) – while at the same time maintaining the average voter's sense that they are voting for regional representation first and ideological second. You therefore have a situation of a voter whose first preference is elected, only to see their advantage wiped out by the additional member; while the next voter sees their first preference candidate lose out to the other party, so that they once again feel that they are without local representation, that their vote is wasted, with whatever consolation that someone or other

from the same party, but (more than likely) another region, has been added from a List to give that party some more representation.

That is the formula popular amongst Mixed system advocates in Canada (c.f. William Irvine of Queens Univ.).

In Germany, once each party's proportion of the national vote total is known, each party is awarded that same proportion in every regional multiseat district. Thus, our above voter's first preference candidate – i.e., from their own region -- is likely to get a seat. However it is not a simple matter. In Canada, for example, the Bloc Quebecois, and other regionally concentrated parties, already receive more seats than their per cent of the national vote warrants. Amongst small parties, only the NDP would qualify (under Germany's thresholds of 5% of the vote and at least one geographic seat, neither of which the Greens nor any other non-legislative party met).

[BQ 10% = 30s, Lib. 35% = 105 s. Cons. 30% = 90s.// NDP 20% = 60s other = 5%].

[BQ 27s = 3   Lib 67s = 40   Cons. 45s = 35   NDP 20s = 40

Based on the results of the 2004 election, the remaining 150 seats would be divided equally amongst the Liberals, Conservatives, and NDP. Thus, if one voted for the Bloc in Quebec, and one's candidate came in second in that riding, they would not get a seat: but Conservatives and NDP, sacrificial lambs under the FPP system, would get seats (along with more Liberals, who one – a traditional Liberal voter – may have been trying to 'send a message' to.).

Thus, *the Mixed system is twice as punishing of regionally concentrated parties* as even nation-wide district systems. The presentation of 'geographic' candidates on the first ballot is a red herring. No system is more hostile to regional representation.

The root of the problem of people advocating the Mixed system, is a habit of looking at electoral systems as a black-and-white dichotomy, between the current First-past-the-post-system, and the other extreme, of country-wide proportional representation, such as that of Israel, where the entire country is a single electoral district. Obviously, between these two extremes is a continuum, whereby systems with two or three-seat districts would still have MPs who thought of themselves as representing a local constituency.

Thus, where the Mixed system fails most is in political payoff. Under M2, there is an incentive for parties to increase their appeal in any region where they are a large party in terms of voter support. With the two-tier system, on the other hand, parties are assured of several seats, even if there is no effort on their part to increase their appeal, with respect to policies of concern to a specific region. In other words, the two-tier system provides no incentive for parties to broaden their cross-regional appeal, to seek regional 'consensus'.

'Proportional rep'

Theory

'Represent' Who?

the number and nature of competing parties

Should the electoral system be changed simply to accommodate small extremist parties (ideological anti-system, ethnic secessionist; e.g. Israel, Italy, Belgium, Germany before banning of anti-system parties, Switzerland, New Zealand. The first four all included these parties in cabinet)? Hopefully the C.A. consensus is not that revolutionary.

[I can't help commenting here that the C.A was formed to see if they could eliminate the outcomes of the 1996 (the party second in votes comes first in seats) and 2001 (not effective opposition) BC elections. This is achieved by M2.]

Historically, the first party system was Conservatives vs. Liberals to their left (radical-revolutionary on the Continent even as late as 1848), then came Labour-Socialists (preferring general strikes) to the left of the Liberals, and since the late 70's their has been Greens-New Left (preferring protests) to the left of Labour. In each case, the new party to the Left have considered the party to their right conservative, reactionary, status quo.

Thus, if we were to draw an ideological spectrum, we would include four parties. Similarly, if we were to design a legislative assembly, we would make room for these same four parties to have some representation. We may also allow for a regional protest party from the 'hinterland', such as the western Reform party of the 90's, and the Australian National party; but we would not want a regional nationalist secessionist party, as in Canada since 1970 and 21st c. Scotland.

The question becomes, how high a PR does it take to accommodate four parties (no higher than M5 or M6); and how low a PR to avoid extremist, ethnic and splinter parties (there are few European countries with M6 to M8, that have all three)?

Practice

I show that the Greens are better off with M5 (than with the Mixed system).

Because of its inferiority regarding 'choice' or 'local rep' compared to almost any other system, and its classification under extreme PR, I addressed Ms. Carr in the audience at Surrey1, pointing out that M5 or M6 was complete PR, and that applies to the electoral success of the Green party as well.

Even though my results were empirically based, they appeared to be absorbed by the minds of the audience in an abstract manner. Consequently, I went back and crunched the numbers for the 2001 BC election. The results were even **better** for the Greens **than** if Mixed were used.

The Greens received 12% of the Provincial vote. Using Mixed or any other extreme-PR national pool system, they would have received 12% of the seats (24% of the national pool seats).

The Green party (the only ones to see themselves as benefitting from the Mixed system or some other form of extreme PR; and the ones most actively promoting it), who received 12.4 % of the vote (and no seats under M1), would have been allocated (with a quota in some districts, and the largest remainder in most), 15.2 % of the seats by M5 or M6. Compare this with extreme PR, which would award them 12% of the seats.

FPP: vote 12.4 %, seats 0.

Mixed: vote 12.4 %, seats 12 %.

M5/M6: vote 12.4% seats 15.2 %

The Green party's relative success in Germany and then New Zealand has led them to make a spurious link between their success and those countries' use of the Mixed system. We can see here, though, that this form of extreme PR is not necessary for them to achieve their perceived wish.

Theory

Here is another problem with the Mixed system from a 'prop rep' perspective, where the seats in the legislature should 'mirror' a party's vote share:

In the case of the New Zealand second ballot, where voters can and often do vote for a different party, we presented a case where everyone cast their second ballot for a different party. This may appeal to those who like to make life difficult for politicians. However, this warped outcome does not just result in having different parties in the legislative pool than those selected in single districts. The whole point is for the legislature to mirror the wishes of voters. Whatever a party gets in the national pool should be what it gets in the House as-a-whole, nit just what it gets in the pool half. In this case, the parties getting the votes in the second ballot national pool will only have half the seats in the legislature; whereas the national pool, by giving them 100% of the votes, mandates that they also receive 100% of the seats in te House as-a-whole.

After the Election

Note once again, though, the annoying fact that parliamentary elections choose a government, not a legislative assembly. In practice, MPs elected in geographic constituencies under the 'mixed' system are only appointed to cabinet if their party is a tiny one that is unsuccessful at getting its members elected from its PR list. Or, the opposite, a party so large that it doesn't get awarded any national pool seats; e.g., in the 2001 BC election, the Liberals (with just over half the vote and almost all the single member seats) would hardly receive any 'additional member' seats. However, in practice, a few parties receive between 10% and 35% of the vote, meaning that they each receive enough additional seats so that all of their cabinet posts come from the national pool. If you are a senior party official, why risk losing in a single geographic riding, even if it is a historically 'safe' seat for your party? Thus, since all parliamentary systems adhere to strict party discipline, all the single-seat members of legislatures using the Mixed system are backbenchers who tow the party line, party platforms that were made by pool-chosen party seniors. Counties that use the PR system universally operate in the following way: Party leaders place themselves at the top of their party lists. This in fact is the definition of party leaders; if you don't have enough power to get your name placed at the top of your party's list, then you're not a party leader. If you are, then you are not only automatically 'elected', even if your party barely passes the 5% threshold, but you are also automatically a member of the cabinet. Never do these people directly face the electorate. In other words, not only are the people in PR countries without a say as to which parties form coalition governments, they also have no say over which MPs are appointed to the cabinet.

Speaking of people in PR countries being without a say as to which parties form coalition governments, in New Zealand since it adopted the Mixed system citizens have not even been able to vote based on some projection of which parties will form an ideological-affinity cooperative arrangement (as they have in Italy). In post-1996 **New Zealand**, where the only party on the left large enough to give the socialists a majority coalition is the Greens, whose uncompromising ways (as in 1980's Germany) have forced the socialists to 'leap-frog' over the large centre-right party, and form a coalition with the latter's splinter groups (all further to the right than the original party) that broke after New Zealand adopted extreme PR (the mixed system).)

Another good example of the problems inherent in the Mixed system also comes from New Zealand, which adopted this system in 1996. In the subsequent election, the majority of voters supported a cluster of left-wing parties. Nevertheless, the leader of a small left-wing party chose power over policy, and joined in a coalition cabinet with the largest right-wing party. In other words, proportional representation did *not match voters' wishes* with actual results. So voters' wishes will **not** more closely match the actual results, by taking away the largest party's majority and replacing it with a coalition government.

[The C.A. comment that single party majority government is the 'least desirable feature' of FPP may not be the most fruitful line of reasoning. It might be better to just leave it out as a criteria, to be pursued or avoided, and focus on all the other vagaries of FPP and of extreme PR]

Extreme PR is meant to create a Representative Assembly of the society as-a-whole. Whereas, the purpose of a Parliamentary election is to choose a government, a cabinet, that has the confidence of a majority of the legislature. And not only does *every parliamentary electoral system produce a* **manufactured majority**, but that majority **is slimmest** under extreme PR, usually including somewhere close to fifty per cent plus-one. This makes them, the least 'decisive' form of electing a government, with only slightly more than half the MPs having their party represented in cabinet. Put another way, almost half the population under PR do not have the parties they voted for represented in the government. Added to this is the fact that the government is a manufactured majority, where the voters have no say in which parties will be included in the government, and which will be excluded. Invariably, one of the parties excluded will be one of the two largest, and in addition more relatively moderate. So *in what way is the typical outcome of extreme PR a 'perfect reflection of the voter's wishes'*?

The biggest problem at this point with PR is party lists and party discipline. In Canada, 300 seats would become 150 elected the current way, of local members, while the other 150 become elected from province-wide lists of party elites. So in Ontario, 55 MPs would be chosen by party leaders from among party favourites. The reader should already begin seeing the potential problems with this system. The same kind of party hacks who get appointed to the Senate now, would have another government body to sit in.

The advocates of this 'Mixed' system are the first to refer to Canada as an elected dictatorship. Thus they seek to take away the largest party's majority. Yet at the same time that they see Canada as an elected dictatorship in practice, they are pretending that it is a parliamentary democracy in practice, whereby the party leaders can be hired and fired by the caucus, and where local MPs are independent of the leaders, and represent the interests of their constituencies. Yet, the reason why Canada is an elected dictatorship, is because party leaders cannot be hired and fired by their caucuses, and MPs are not independent. The reason for this is 'party discipline', the party leader punishing MPs in one way or another, if they do not show footsoldier-like obedience. In this regard, Canada is the worst offender in the world, of any country with a tradition of British parliamentary democracy. Thus, the *means* of making Canadian prime ministers and party leaders accountable *will have less to do with voting, than with parliamentary reform*.

Meanwhile**, party** discipline under proportional representation 'party list' systems is much **more** severe. Proportional representation MPs are much more at the mercy of bosses. Furthermore, not

only are the carrots and sticks of the party leaders bigger, but there is no pressure coming from the other direction, from local constituencies, especially with respect to re-election. It is therefore very doubtful if this formula would increase *regional representation* in any meaningful way, any more than an appointed Senate has.

To see this problem specifically to Canada, the national party with advocates (e.g., Lorne Nystrom) of the Mixed system is the NDP (in BC it has included Adriane Carr of the seat-less Green Party). The reasoning behind this is simple: the party that is punished the most by FPP is a small one (in vote total) with diffuse national support; while a similarly small one with all of its support concentrated in one region can be disproportionately rewarded in seat total. By some NDP members' logic, then, the NDP would benefit from a system of strict proportionality. However, let's see how such a system would play out in the real world of PR, with strict party discipline and lists.

Historically, most of the NDP's voter support has been concentrated in the West, to the point where all of its seat representation is from the West. However, the Party has practiced a system of national conventions where each individual district is represented equally. Consequently, the Party has always been dominated by Ontario. While most of its MPs have always been from the West, every leader of the Party has been from Ontario, excepting a recent four-year anomaly.

This gives us an educated guess as to what would happen to NDP representation in the House of Commons under PR. The NDP, with around fifteen per cent of the vote, thanks mostly to the West, would have a list where most of its top-ten or top-twenty people in the party hierarchy are from Ontario. In effect, the West would be electing MPs from Ontario.

These MP,s in turn, would resemble nothing so much as our current Senate appointees. Fine people, no doubt, but all of them there thanks to their undying loyalty to their party and the Prime Minister's faction of that party. Not only would these individuals not be directly elected, not only would they add to party discipline, but they would also represent their party's ideological purity, the type of person least likely to agree to compromise. Think of the Greens in Germany and New Zealand, the religious parties Israel, the socialist party in Spain. Do not think of 'consensus' or moderation.

Simplicity, Familiarity and Transparent Counting

[*The single-member plurality system is familiar and straightforward. Voters are simply required to indicate their preferred candidate from the list of names presented. Winners are determined by a simple count of the ballots and are known almost immediately*.]

vs. both MMP and STV are not simple or transparent [vs. open list systems]

Before I describe the one system that satisfies all of their criteria, I would like to go through the Sept. 12 comments that Ken Carty made to the C.A., that he thinks they should focus on first.

The first is the problems with the current system, and do we know what they are? See chapter 1, which lists the 'vagaries' of FPP. Even Mr. Nielson, in his defense of FPP, agrees that the lack of

'effective opposition' in the 2001-2005 BC legislature is a weakness. Dr. Carty then goes on to ask, is there an alternative that would address these issues? Ch. 1. also demonstrates that this and all of the other vagaries of FPP disappear, at M2 (an average of 2 seat ridings (e.g. half M1 rural and half M3 urban) awarded proportionally).

Dr. Carty's second line of questions or thoughts, is what problems will the new alternative create? Will the cure be worse than the disease? Ch. 1 also demonstrates that M2 produces more favourable results than FPP for what FPP is supposed to be good at -- cabinet stability.

Ch. 1 also demonstrates that complete PR is achieved by M6; i.e, there is no good reason to have higher PR, to have the Mixed system or any other form of extreme PR. Nothing good can come from it. Part II of the manuscript demonstrates that PR higher than M5 (the highest used by STV systems, due to their ack of simplicity), universally produces more extreme parties and unstable cabinets.[see Surrey 1/Vancouver 3, and # 0341]

Now, I will show the one **system that meets the above criteria**, and also that of Mr. Loenen, Ms. Carr and Ms. Morey.

I began by trying to satisfy the C.A. criteria in their March Statement. I also understood 'local rep' to include the concerns of rural BC. We have seen from Ch. 1 that a combination of M1 in rural BC and M3 in urban BC would result in an average of M2, which in turn removes all of the vagaries of FPP (which the Statement lists), while also satisfying the 'top value' of 'some measure of PR'.

Keep in mind that anything higher than M2 is only to achieve one 'value', higher PR; and that anything higher, and cabinet stability cannot be guaranteed. However, since the C.A. has declared cabinet stability a 'least desirable feature', we can go higher.

I also set a limit on the highest PR of M6, to avoid the vagaries of extreme PR. That is, I only went so far as to have urban districts of M5 or M6.

Most liberal democracies use list-PR, and most list-PR countries have one or more districts with M as low as M1 (and as high as double-digits). Only STV avoids them as a rule. So it appears to be o.k. to have M1 districts. However, we want to avoid the vagaries of extreme PR that these countries with districts higher than M6 have to deal with.

What I wanted to do, was achieve the complete PR that M6 provides, while still providing M1 in rural districts.

Mr. Loenen, it turned out, was trying to do the same thing (ATV = M1 STV in GVRD = M5). However, **no country using PR has an objective formula** for deciding which districts should be M1 and which M20. For example, Ms. Morey pointed out that the provincial regional district for the North would result in M6.

Thus, I worked out a 'population density' formula, so that all rural districts and only rural districts, would use M1, while urban centres would have PR no higher than M6

List of different systems, cross out to eliminate from consideration:

M1:

FPP/M1 plur.
ATV/M1 pref.
Run-off/M1 maj.

Low PR:

SNTV (Japan) M3-M5
STV (Ireland, municipal) M3-5
M2 (eliminates all of the vagaries of FPP/M1, retains single party maj. govt.)
Pop. density formula (logarithmic) M1/M2 (rural) - M5/M7 (GVRD)
Party List, open ballot, all districts the same size, M5
Party List, open ballot, district size = rep by pop, avg. M6 to M8

Extreme PR:

Party List, open ballot, district size = rep by pop, avg. M20 (Italy from 1940's to 1990's)

Mixed/Additional Member. Closed or open ballot (Germany: threshold, banning of extremists, and conditional confidence vote were added later)

Nation-wide district (Israel). Closed ballot