## PREFERENTIAL-PLUS

A new, effective, made-in-BC voting system to elect MLAs.

# Submission to the Citizens Assembly on Electoral Reform 

Nick Loenen

December, 2003

No one whose opinion has weight, will contend that some clumsy machine of primitive times, which served its day and generation, is for ever to be regarded with superstitious reverence.

Sir Sandford Fleming on the need to change Canada's
first-past-the-post voting system, taken from
On The Rectification of Parliament address delivered to the Canadian Institute, Toronto, 1892

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Nick Loenen is a former Richmond City Councillor (1983-87), and former Member of the British Columbia Legislature (1986-91). In 1992 he enrolled in a Masters program at UBC for the express purpose of studying voting systems. He obtained his Masters Degree in political science from UBC in 1995. His book Citizenship and Democracy, a case for proportional representation was published by Dundurn Press, Toronto in 1997. In 1998 he founded Fair Voting BC a multipartisan citizens group which since its inception lobbied for a referendum on voting system reform and helped shape the Citizens Assembly process.

Nick Loenen has written extensively on the need to make the voting system more democratic and on what system is best for British Columbia given our geography and political culture. Nick chaired the Reform Party of Canada's Task Force on Electoral Reform in 1997. The recommendations of the Task Force were accepted in 1998 and shaped the policies for electoral reform of both the Reform Party of Canada and its successor, the Canadian Alliance.

More recently Loenen chaired the Adhoc-Committee on the Provincial Constitution which produced significant recommendations on making government more accountable. He is a member of the Canadian Study of Parliament Group, and travelled to Gabon, Africa as one of four Canadians to observe and monitor the elections there on December 6, 1998.

Contact info: 5611 Jaskow Dr. Richmond, BC V7E 5W4 Tel. 604-274-3868
e-mail: nloenen@attcanada.ca

## CONTENTS

Executive Summary ..... p. 3
What British Columbians Expect from their Voting System: Five Goals ..... p. 4
Suggested: Fourteen Multi-seat Ridings ..... p. 6
Suggested: Nine Single-seat Ridings ..... p. 11
Sample Ballot ..... p. 12
Rating Selected Voting Systems Against the Five Goals ..... p. 13
What Would Have Happened in 2001? ..... p. 16
Selected Writings by Author ..... p. 17
"On the Rectification of Parliament", Sir Sandford Fleming 1892 ..... p. 17

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RECOMMENDATION
That British Columbia's current voting system be replaced by Preferential-Plus - a preferential ballot to elect candidates in a mix of multi-seat and single-seat ridings for a total of seventy-nine seats. Single-seat ridings for the most rural ridings and multi-seat ridings for the more urban ridings.

Preferential-Plus is designed to meet British Columbia's unique geography, diverse and polarized political culture, and British form of government.

The submission starts by listing Five Goals, which it is submitted accurately capture what most British Columbians expect from their voting system.

Preferential-Plus is designed to best meet those five goals.
Preferential-Plus is not full proportional representation, it is an in-between system. Most proportional representation systems decrease local representation and increase the power of political parties. In contrast, Preferential-Plus has the potential to make local representation more effective and to lessen party power.

While Preferential-Plus is not a full proportional system it comes close. Currently, in a typical election just over fifty percent of votes cast are wasted votes. (Wasted votes are votes for losing candidates, such votes do not contribute to the election results, they help elect no one) Preferential-Plus wastes at most just over eighteen percent of votes cast.

Preferential-Plus is a mix of the Single Transferable Vote and the Alternative Vote, both of which are long established, time-tested voting systems.

The submission suggests a particular grouping of multi-seat and single-seat ridings, but only as an example. Preferential-Plus works equally well with other groupings provided the number of multi and single-seat ridings is not altered significantly from what this submission recommends.

## Benefits include:

- No need to enlarge the legislature.
- No need to significantly redraw riding boundaries.
- Reduces wasted vote from $51 \%$ to $18.4 \%$.
- Eliminates "safe" seats.
- Cleans up the nomination process.
- Greater inclusion for the people "beyond Hope".
- Holds the best potential for less party discipline.
- Holds the best promise for more accountability in government.
- Sacrifices some proportionality for more effective local representation.
- Tailored to meet BC's geography, political culture, and history
- This is the compromise system most likely to find popular acceptance.


## What British Columbians Expect from their Voting System

## BROAD PROPORTIONALITY

People want the government they vote for. Following the last election $42 \%$ of the voters are virtually without representation. The two elections before that produced ten years of majority NDP government supported by just $40 \%$ of the voters. No $40 \%$ should ever have all the power, nor be completely ignored.

During 1991-2001 BC had government not supported by 60\% of the voters. Sixty percent did not vote for that party, that leader, those policies, yet that is what we had. The legislature should more accurately reflect how people vote.

All votes should count and count equally. Few votes, if any, should be wasted. Votes in all ridings, whether "safe" or not, whether rural or urban should be courted and pursued equally. In particular, the vote of rural ridings needs to matter more.

Why "broadly" proportional? Trade offs are necessary. We may not want full proportional representation.

## MORE CHOICE

For many British Columbians casting a ballot is often constrained by strategic calculations. Too many voters do not vote for their first choice, lest they waste their vote and/or help a party they favour even less. Vote splitting must end. The system should allow people to express their true intentions.

The ballot should give voters more choice. Currently, there are many "safe" seats. In those ridings the real contest is at the nomination meeting. More choice on the ballot will open all seats to a democratic contest on Election Day.

Enlarging choice on the ballot enables voters to influence a wider range of political issues. Currently, elections do not allow input on more than one issue. For example, in the last election "Get rid of the NDP" trumped all other issues.

Elections should provide voters with many choices, not just one.

## STABLE GOVERNMENT

Elections are meant to produce a government capable of governing. We do not want an Italian pizza parliament full of splinter parties, or extremist groups. Governing coalitions should not fall apart every six months.

During the 10 year period 1991-2001 BC had seven premiers, many cabinet shuffles, and an excessively rapid turnover of MLAs. We must bring a good measure of stability to our system.

## INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

British Columbian politics suffers from extreme polarization. We must lessen the wild swings in public policy, and more consistently serve the long-term public interest, rather than short-term partisan interests.

MLAs tend to become party property the day after the election. Often, they represent Victoria to their constituents more than their constituents to Victoria. MLAs must be able to speak for their constituents. Party discipline is too severe.

MLAs need a measure of independence, allowing the Legislature to occasionally hold the premier and cabinet in check. The concentration of power in the premier's office is excessive.

MLAs have little clout. Decisions of importance should be made by the people's representatives on the floor of the legislature. US Congressmen make laws, in contrast BC MLAs lack a law-making role.

## MAINTAIN A SIGNIFICANT LINK BETWEEN MLAs AND GEOGRAPHIC CONSTITUENCIES

Ability to identify one's "own" MLA is important. The personal service MLAs give to constituents should not be diminished.

The nomination of candidates and the election of MLAs should depend less on a favourable party standing, and more on being known to and popular among the voters of a particular constituency.

SUGGESTED 14 multi-seat and 9 single-seat ridings. NOTE: under Preferential-Plus the grouping of ridings is open to many possibilities. This is just one example to show how it could be done. What is important is that the number of multi and singleseat ridings not be altered, for that would affect how proportional the system is.

## TO SEE HOW VOTES ARE CAST IN MULTI-SEAT RIDINGS SEE SAMPLE BALLOT, PAGE 12

| Existing Ridings | Population (1996) | Proposed ridings and (number of seats) |  | Population per MLA | $\%$ of votes needed to win a seat ${ }^{1}$ | Number of votes needed to win a seat ${ }^{2}$ | Maximum number and percentage (\%) of wasted votes ${ }^{3}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Victoria | (7) | 48,295 | 12.5 \% | 21,018 | 21,011 (12.5\%) |
| Esquimalt-Metchosin | 46,890 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Oak Bay-GordonHead | 47,710 |  |  |  |  | Election votes | eeded to |
| Saanich North/Islands | 50,860 |  |  |  |  | Liberal seat 11 | 1.298 |
| Saanich South | 47,970 |  |  |  |  | NDP Vote 44,64 |  |
| Malahat-Juan De Fuca | 47,170 |  |  |  |  | Gre |  |
| Victoria-Beacon Hill | 49,480 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Victoria-Hillside | 47,990 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Island | (6) | 54,544 | 14.3 \% | 21,465 | 21,459 (14.3 \%) |
| Alberni-Qualicum | 50,790 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Comox Valley | 54,910 |  |  |  |  | Election votes | needed to |
| Cowichan-Ladysmith | 50,640 |  |  |  |  | Liberal seat 13 | 3,711 |
| Nanaimo | 51,450 |  |  |  |  | NDP Vote 39,363 |  |
| Nanaimo-Parksville | 51,840 |  |  |  |  | Green Vote 21 | ,292 |
| North Island | 57,050 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

[^0]| Existing Ridings | Population (1996) | Proposed ridings and (number of seats) | Population per MLA | $\%$ of votes needed to win a seat | Number of votes needed to win a seat | Maximum number and percentage (\%) of wasted votes |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Vancouver West ${ }^{4}$ (5) 52,460 |  | 16.7 \% | 18,611 | 18,606 (16.7 \%) |
| Vancouver-Burrard | 53,000 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vancouver-Fairview | 51,960 |  |  | 2001 Election votes needed to win a Liberal seat 13,263 Total NDP Vote 21,739 Total Green Vote 19,257 |  |  |
| Vancouver-Langara | 51,850 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vancouver-Point Grey | 52,120 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vancouver-Quilchena | 53,370 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | Vancouver East (5) | 51,988 | 16.7 \% | 17,879 | 17,874 (16.7 \%) |
| Vancouver-Fraserview | 50,320 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Vancouver-Hastings | 53,590 |  |  | 2001 E | ction votes needed |  |
| Vancouver-Kensington | 51,590 |  |  | win a seat | t 8,591 |  |
| Vancouver-Kingsway | 52,480 |  |  | Total N | Vote 33,894 |  |
| Vancouver-Mnt. Pleasant | 51,960 |  |  | Total G | en Vote 10,423 |  |


|  |  |
| :--- | ---: |
| North Vanc.-Lonsdale | 45,760 |
| North Vanc.-Seymour | 53,170 |
| Powell River-Sunshine C. | 44,900 |
| West Vanc.-Capilano | 48,080 |
| West Vanc.-Garibaldi | 47,600 |

## North Shore (5) 47,901

$16.7 \% \quad 18,167 \quad 18,162(16.7 \%)$
2001 Election votes needed to
win a Liberal seat 16,733
Total NDP Vote 15,730
Total Green Vote 20,889

[^1]| Existing Ridings | Population <br> $(1996)$ | Proposed <br> ridings and <br> (number of seats) | Population <br> per MLA | \% of votes <br> needed to <br> win a seat | Number of <br> votes needed <br> to win a seat | Maximum number <br> and percentage (\%) <br> of wasted votes |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| (5) |  |  |  |  |  |  |



| Existing Ridings | Population <br> $(1996)$ | Proposed <br> ridingss and <br> (number of seats) | Population <br> per MLA | \% of votes <br> needed to <br> win a seat | Number of <br> votes needed <br> to win a seat | Maximum number <br> and percentage (\%) <br> of wasted votes |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| East-Kootenay | 38,220 | Kootenay | (3) | 43,096 | $25 \%$ | 15,030 |$\quad 15,027(25 \%)$

[^2]| Nine Single-seat Ridings ( Ballot p 12) | so elected | preferential ba | ing | es m | 50\% plu | ee Sampl |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Existing Ridings | Population (1996) | Number of seats | Population per MLA | \% of votes needed to win a seat | Number of votes needed to win a seat | Maximum number of wasted votes |
| Bulkley Valley-Stikine | 32,180 | 1 | 32,180 | $50 \%$ | 6,630 | 6,628 |
| Cariboo North | 37,510 | 1 | 37,510 | $50 \%$ | 7,731 | 7,729 |
| Cariboo South | 36,450 | 1 | 36,450 | $50 \%$ | 8,246 | 8,244 |
| Columbia River-Revelstoke | 34,060 | 1 | 34,060 | $50 \%$ | 7,233 | 7,231 |
| North Coast | 31,680 | 1 | 31,680 | $50 \%$ | 5,431 | 5,429 |
| Peace River North | 31,010 | 1 | 31,010 | $50 \%$ | 4,527 | 4,525 |
| Peace River South | 30,950 | 1 | 30,950 | $50 \%$ | 4,982 | 4,980 |
| Skeena | 34,210 | 1 | 34,210 | $50 \%$ | 6,641 | 6,639 |
| Yale-Lillooet | 38,290 | 1 | 38,290 | $50 \%$ | 8,195 | 8,193 |
| Average | 34,037 ${ }^{7}$ |  | 34,037 |  | 6,624 ${ }^{\text {8 }}$ | 6,622 ${ }^{\text {9 }}$ |

[^3]SAMPLE BALLOT
PREFERENTIAL-PLUS FOR MULTI-SEAT RIDINGS
(Note: Single-seat ridings use the same ballot except that each party nominates just one candidate)

| RANK | CANDIDATES | PARTY | North Shore Riding Five (5) seats to be elected |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| [ ] | Adams, Henry | NDP |  |
| [ ] | Beaver, Shirley |  |  |
| [ ] | Yeung, Kwok |  | INSTRUCTIONS |
| [ ] | Goodenough, Bill |  |  |
| [ ] | Hugh , Trustme |  | Rank candidates in order of preference. Place 1 |
| [ ] | Bencher, Albert | LIBERAL |  |
| [ ] | Who, Joe |  | opposite your first choice, |
| [ ] | Deepvoice, Brian |  | 2 opposite your second |
| [ ] | Lee, Wong |  | choice, and so on. |
| [ ] | Watchme, Pierre |  |  |
| [ ] | Duck, Donald | UNITY | or as few candidates as |
| [ ] | Evancio, Roger |  | you wish |
| [ ] | Freud, Sigmund |  |  |
| $\bigcirc 1$ | Vander Smuck, Jr. |  | Do not put the same |
| [ ] | Fromm, Eric | GREEN | number opposite more |
| [ ] | Dover, Louie |  | than one name, or skip a |
| [ ] | Evans, Glenn |  | number. It spoils your ballot. |
| $\lceil 1$ | Choice, People's |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & {\left[\begin{array}{l} \text { ] } \\ {[ } \\ {[ } \end{array}\right]} \end{aligned}$ | Faithful, Bea Goofy, Fred Friendly, Jessica | FAMILY FIRST | If you do spoil your ballot return it for another. |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| [ ] | Laka, John IN | INDEPENDENT |  |
| [ ] | Soother, Marg |  |  |
| [ ] | Dogood, Mary |  |  |
| $\Gamma 1$ | Johal, Sarah |  |  |

RATING SELECTED SYSTEMS AGAINST THE FIVE GOALS
FPTP First past the post (technically, Single Member Plurality)
AV Alternative Vote (colloquially Preferential Ballot)
MMP
PP Preferential-Plus (technically a combination of Single Transferable
Mixed Member Proportional Vote and Alternative Vote)
(1 = POOR 5 = GOOD)

## BROAD

PROPORTIONALITY
FPTP
AV
MMP
PP

- Why not give MMP full marks? BC's geography requires regional lists, more lists increases wasted votes which lessens proportionality. In addition, BC's diverse and polarized politics will almost certainly mean the number of small parties who come in under the "threshold" is sufficient to to raise the wasted vote under MMP to somewhere between 10 and 12 percent.
- PP could be higher if district-size were 5 or more throughout the province.
- FPTP and AV both equally disproportionate.


## CHOICE 1 2 5

- AV will end vote splitting, or strategic voting. But some ridings will still be "safe".
- MMP will permit registering an opinion over a wider range of issues, but the selection of a local candidate is still narrow, restricted, and subject to vote splitting.
- PP ends vote splitting, ballots list more candidates, and preferential voting is more precise, transparent, and nuanced than X balloting.
- PP in the multi-seat ridings allows voters to rank candidates within parties, and candidates among parties.
- Allowing voters to rank candidates within the same party means all voters participate in the nomination process much like the US primaries.
- PP eliminates "safe" seats and prevents unseemly nomination battles.
- PP by electing candidates in multi-member ridings ensures a broader range of political interests and issues will be represented than is possible under any other system. (see Harry Rankin phenomenon note: page 16)

|  | FPTP | AV | MMP | PP |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| STABLE GOV. | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 |

- Why not give FPTP and AV top marks? They produce very high turnover of MLAs. Federally, 1993, 200 rookie MPs; provincially, 1991, 1996 and 2001 all had high turnovers.
- Under FPTP and AV, turnover of cabinets is less frequent, but under MMP and PP subsequent cabinets tend to consist of largely the same players, while under FPTP and AV subsequent cabinets tend to be completely new. Cabinet might be stable between elections, but the regime as a whole is far less stable. Examples, provincially, 1991 SC is wiped out. In 2001 the NDP is wiped out. Federally, 1993 PC is wiped out.
- MMP is more proportional, hence it is more susceptible to party proliferation.
- $\quad P P$ is less susceptible to party proliferation, because (1) it is less proportional than MMP (PP wastes $18.4 \%$ of votes at most, MMP will waste between 10 and 12 percent), and (2) it has the potential to reduce party discipline and permit greater diversity within each party. PP allows more independence to MLAs, independence leads to less turnover.


## INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

- $\quad$ AV will lessen polarization somewhat, but like FPTP it fails on all other counts.
- MMP will produce coalition government, hence lessen polarization and wild swings in public policy,
- MMP will not lessen party discipline. It offers no inducement for MLAs to pay more attention to voters than is the case under FPTP.
- MMP will empower the legislature somewhat because when no one party has majority control committees of the legislature have the potential to be more independent
- $\quad$ PP deserves full marks. Applied to BC it will almost certainly, in a typical election, result in coalition government and lessen polarization and wild swings in public policy.
- In addition, PP holds the greatest potential to lessen party discipline, make MLAs pay more attention to their voters than to their parties, and give MLAs a measure of independence. The US has less party discipline because of their primaries. PP has a built-in primary.
- $\quad$ PP holds promise to restore the purpose of parliament, which is to place a check on the powers of the executive, MMP does not.
- $\quad$ PP by using preferential balloting induces cooperation and bridging of political differences.

|  | FPTP | AV | MMP | PP |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| GEOGRAPHIC | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 |

- Under PP voters will have more than one MLA representing their riding. Competition will make MLAs pay more attention to their constituents between elections. Also, more voters will have a MLA of their own political pursuasion.
- AV will maintain the local link, as is under FPTP; MMP weakens the local link; PP will strengthen the local link.
- In PP's multi-member ridings parties and candidates will position themselves to capture whatever representational vacuums there are. If voters want someone to represent their area, that need will be filled. For example, if Surrey returns seven MLAs, each one-eigth plus one of all votes cast can elect "their" member, and they will, because if there is some politically relevant need that goes unmet some candidate will run on that platform. Note, each existing riding within the multi-seat ridings can elect "their" MLA, if they so wish. Nor is it necessary for candidates to have a province-wide affiliation. (See Note page 16)
- FPTP, and AV are designed to represent geography, List-PR systems common in Europe are designed to represent political ideology. PP in multi-seat ridings has no such biases, it leaves the decision about what to represent to the voter. Some will favour geography, others a political program, and still others some combination.
- New Zealand farmers on the North Island report their amazement that since 1996 candidates and parties have actually come to court their vote. Similarly, voters in the BC Interior and Northern ridings will be empowered under more proportional voting systems. Their votes will be needed more than under FPTP and AV.
- Unlike the other systems, PP will permit independent candidates to be elected, as was the case in the most recent Ulster election. PP has no "threshold", hence, a candidate whose appeal is strictly local can get elected.

MMP
PP

22

## WHAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED IN 2001 UNDER PREFERENTIAL-PLUS?

DISCLAIMER: Predicting results had there been a different voting system is always highly speculative.

- Liberals might have won a majority with 56 , instead of 77 seats.
- NDP might have won 10 seats outright (Victoria 2, Island, Vancouver 4, Surrey, Fraser Valley North, Kootenay) and possibly another 6 (Island, North Shore, Delta, Surrey, Simon Fraser, Fraser Valley South, Kamloops) from $2^{\text {nd }}, 3^{\text {rd }}$, etc. preferences for a total of 16 seats.
- Green might have won 5 seats outright (Victoria, Island, Vancouver (2), North Shore) and possibly another 2 (Surrey, Simon Fraser) from $2^{\text {nd }}, 3{ }^{\text {rd }}$, etc. preferences for a total of 7 seats.
- Unity and Marijuana might not have won any seats. A party could win seats on less than three percent popular support but only if such support is geographically concentrated.

|  | 2001 Results with FPTP | Possible Results with PP |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Liberal | 77 seats <br> 58 percent | 56 seats |
| NDP | 2 seats <br> 22 percent | 16 seats |
| Green | no seats 12 percent | 7 seats |
| Unity | no seats 3 percent | no seats |
| Marijuana | no seats 3 percent | no seats |

Note: Some independents might have won seats because PP has no "threshold", making it possible for a candidate whose appeal is strictly local to get elected. And what makes it likely is the Harry Rankin phenomenon. Rankin was a longtime Vancouver Councillor who usually topped the polls but twice failed the mayorality race. People will give some support to colourful, even maverick characters provided they are one of a larger group, but not where voters have just one choice. Electing candidates in multi-member ridings ensures a broader range of political interests and issues will be represented than is possible under any other system.

## SELECTED WRITINGS BY AUTHOR

"Should Canada Consider Proportional Representation?", The Annual Mel Smith Lecture, Trinity Western University, Langley BC. March 15, 2002
"Polarization: Its How BC Votes", Westender, Vancouver and other community newspapers. February, 2002
"Finding New Ways to Vote", Fraser Forum, Dec. 2001, Fraser Institute, Vancouver, BC. December 2001
"Selecting Representatives: A Case for Changing the Voting System and a Consideration of Alternative Systems", Fraser Institute conference on Finally, Reforming Politics: The BC Blueprint, Vancouver, BC. November 22, 2001 Reprinted in Gibson. G, ed. Fixing Canadian Democracy, Fraser Institute, 2003. For a brief, easy to read statement of the author's current views this is best.
"Our Parliament is a Disgrace to Democracy", Vancouver Sun, A23, Vancouver BC. November 30, 2000
"THE BEST ELECTORAL SYSTEM FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA", paper prepared for the Adhoc Committee on the British Columbia constitution. August 2000
"SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE for BRITISH COLUMBIA", paper prepared for the British Columbia Political Science conference. May 14-15, 1999.

A Case for the Single Transferable Vote, brief submitted the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario. March 25, 1998

Citizenship and Democracy, a Case for Proportional Representation, Toronto: Dundurn Press. March 1997

REPORT OF ELECTORAL REFORM TASK FORCE for Reform Party of Canada. February 1997
"Electoral Reform is a Must", Canadian Parliamentary Review, Summer 1995, Ottawa, Ont. Summer 1995

Single Transferable Vote for British Columbia, Master Thesis, Department of Political Science UBC. May, 1995
"Politics: Give it Back to the People", The Province, C31, Vanc., BC June 5, 1991

## SUGGESTED READING

"On the Rectification of Parliament", Sir Sandford Fleming, an address delivered in Toronto to the Canadian Institute in 1892. The Copp, Clark Company, Ltd., Toronto, 1892


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ This percentage equals the number of valid votes cast divided by (one plus the number of seats for this riding).
    ${ }^{2}$ Based on valid votes cast in the 2001 election in each electoral riding within the proposed multi-seat riding.
    ${ }^{3}$ Wasted votes are votes that do not contribute to the election of anyone. The number is based on 2001 results.

[^1]:    ${ }^{4}$ Vancouver could also be one, ten-seat riding. It would reduce the province-wide maximum wasted vote from $18.4 \%$ to $17.3 \%$.

[^2]:    ${ }^{5}$ Note: the value of each vote is more equal than is possible under FPTP. Under Preferential-Plus the deviation from the provincial average for votes needed to win a seat is $24 \%$ over and $32 \%$ under. Under FPTP, in 2001, the Liberal vote in those ridings they won varied from $48 \%$ over to $46 \%$ under the average.
    ${ }^{6}$ Average number of votes per winning seat under FPTP in 2001 for all ridings within the 14 multi-seat ridings. The minimum average number needed under Preferential Plus to win a seat in these 14 multi-seat ridings is $45 \%$ higher. Seats won under Preferential-Plus have greater democratic legitimacy.

[^3]:    ${ }^{7}$ Single-seat ridings population totals 306,333 , or $8.2 \%$ of the province's total population.
    ${ }^{8}$ Based on Valid Votes, 2001
    ${ }^{9}$ Maximum number of votes wasted for both multi-seat and single-seat ridings total 293,987 , or $18.4 \%$ of total valid votes in 2001. In a typical BC election under FPTP between $\mathbf{5 0} \mathbf{- 5 2 \%}$ of votes are wasted votes. Within the 14 multi-seat ridings maximum wasted votes total 237,389 or $14.9 \%$. For the 9 single-seat ridings maximum wasted votes equals just over $50 \%$ typically.

