SUBMISSION TO THE CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY ON
ELECTORAL REFORM
February 12, 2004
Dr. Bryan Schwartz, Professor of Law, University of
Manitoba
E-mail: bschwar@cc.umanitoba.ca;
Phone: 204-474-6142;
fax: 204-474-7580;
Mail: 300M, Robson Hall, Dysart Road,
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3N 0T7
The merits of “Proportional Representation
(PR) Light”: Keeping the best elements of
the current system while overcoming its principal
defects.
I respectfully recommend that the Citizens’ Assembly
propose “PR
Light”.
“PR Light” means keeping the
existing system and adding about 20% extra “PR
seats”. Priority for these PR seats would go to the
parties that are under-represented on the basis of popular
vote.
My views are the result of two independent studies I have
conducted very recently.
“Valuing Canadians: The Options for Voting System
Reform in Canada” (written with Darla
Rettie) is a study commissioned by the Law Commission
of Canada and released near the end of 2003 (see link at the end of
this submission)
It is written in plain English, and was was
expressly prepared with a view to being useful to groups such as
yours.
“Valuing Canadians” proposes
a framework to identify and evaluate the main
options. It attempts to explain fairly the
strengths and weakness of each.
We hope that the study will assist the Citizens’
Assembly as it works its way through the options. The tentative
conclusion that we reached is that “PR
Light” seems to be the best theoretical and practical
choice for Canada.
“Proportional Representation for Canada”
was published in 2001 in a special issue of the Manitoba Law
Journal (see link at the end of this submission). It
explores how various models of PR would actually work in
Canada. It looks at past federal and provincial
elections. For example, how
many majority or minority governments would there have
been in Canada and Manitoba under different versions of
PR? If the Assembly is interested, we could
try to apply our analytic model to past election results in British
Columbia.
Why PR Light, rather than the other models?
“PR Light” has the following
advantages:
It keeps the best features of the current system.
This includes most legislative assembly members remaining
accountable to one specific constituency.
Most members will still have to go door-to-door at elections,
rather than being effectively “parachuted”
into the legislative assembly by party leaders;
-
While there would be more minority governments, majority
governments are still possible. The public
would still have the opportunity to elect either kind of
government, and see which performs the best;
-
It is pragmatic and flexible. It
does not revolutionize the system, but instead constructively
reforms it. It is relatively easy to
“undo” if it does not turn out well; most
members will not have a vested interest in keeping it, since they
would remain directly elected by their respective
constituents. It does not require creating
a large number of extra seats. (As the size
of an assembly rises, so does its costs, and the influence of any
individual member tends to dwindle). It is
also easy to adjust; the percentage of PR seats (20%)
can be moved up or down in light of practical experience.
The competitors of PR Light tend to have substantial
disadvantages:
-
The current system can produce
drastic inequities. For example, in the
last federal election, the Liberals received over four times as
many seats per vote as did the Progressive
Conservatives. Strong opposition parties (e.g., those
with thirty to forty per cent of the vote) can find themselves with
few seats, or none at all. Smaller, but
still significant parties may find themselves perpetually
“shut out” of the assembly;
-
The “single transferrable
vote” (STV) system used by Ireland
has some theoretical strengths. It does not appear,
however, to be well suited to Canadian conditions and
traditions. STV works only if there are constituencies
that elect at least three to five members
each. In Canada -, including British
Columbia - some constituencies would have be enormous
geographically to support three to five
members. Gone would be the simple and
direct line of accountability between one constituency and one
member. Furthermore, the change from the current system
would be drastic and hard to undo if it does not turn out well;
-
“Alternative voting”
is, as Winston Churchill once commented, the least rational of all
the mainstream alternatives. It gives undue
weight to the second and third choices of the supporters of fringe
parties;
-
The “New Zealand model”
(about 50% PR seats) would tend to lose too many of the strengths
of the current system. It can result in too much power
for party leaders and too many members who are not directly and
clearly accountable to one particular constituency.
I would look forward to assisting the Assembly in any way it
considers helpful, including making a
presentation.
As supporting material, I am attaching:
Valuing
Canadians: The Options for Voting System Reform in
Canada, (Law Commission of Canada, 2003), (in PDF
format)
Proportional
Representation for Canada, (2001) 28 Manitoba Law Journal 133
(in PDF format).