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Submission SCHWARTZ-0051 (Online)

Submission By Bryan Schwartz, Professor of Law, University of Manitoba
AddressWinnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
OrganizationI am strictly independent and non partisan
Date20040112
CategoryElectoral system change, Link/reference to other resources
Abstract
The 'PR Light' electoral system is the most appropriate choice for BC.  It uses an additional member system to remove some of the disproportionality in the current system while preserving the possibility of majority governments. [3 pages+links]

Submission Content
SUBMISSION TO THE CITIZENS’ ASSEMBLY ON ELECTORAL REFORM 

February 12, 2004  

Dr. Bryan Schwartz,  Professor of Law, University of Manitoba 

E-mail:   bschwar@cc.umanitoba.ca;

Phone:   204-474-6142; fax:   204-474-7580;

Mail:   300M, Robson Hall, Dysart Road, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3N 0T7

The merits of “Proportional Representation (PR) Light”:  Keeping the best elements of the current system while overcoming its principal defects. 

I respectfully recommend that the Citizens’ Assembly propose “PR Light”.  

“PR Light” means  keeping the existing system and adding about 20% extra “PR seats”. Priority for these PR seats would go to the parties that are under-represented on the basis of popular vote. 

My views are the result of two independent studies I have conducted very recently. 

“Valuing Canadians: The Options for Voting System Reform in Canada” (written with Darla Rettie)  is a study commissioned by the Law Commission of Canada and released near the end of 2003 (see link at the end of this submission)

It is written in plain English, and was  was expressly prepared with a view to being useful to groups such as yours.  

“Valuing Canadians”  proposes a framework to identify and evaluate the main  options.   It attempts to explain fairly the strengths and weakness of each.  

We hope that the study will assist the Citizens’ Assembly as it works its way through the options. The tentative conclusion that we reached is that “PR Light” seems to be the best theoretical and practical choice for Canada.

“Proportional Representation for Canada” was published in 2001 in a special issue of the Manitoba Law Journal (see link at the end of this submission).  It explores how various models of PR would actually work in Canada.  It looks at past federal and provincial elections.   For example, how many  majority or minority governments would there have been in Canada and Manitoba under different versions of PR?   If the Assembly is interested, we could try to apply our analytic model to past election results in British Columbia. 

Why PR Light, rather than the other models?

“PR Light” has the following advantages:

It keeps the best features of the current system.  This includes most legislative assembly members remaining accountable to one specific constituency.   Most members will still have to go door-to-door at elections, rather than being effectively “parachuted” into the legislative assembly by party leaders;

  • While there would be more minority governments, majority governments are still possible.  The public would still have the opportunity to elect either kind of government, and see which performs the best;
  • It is pragmatic and flexible.  It does not revolutionize the system, but instead constructively reforms it.   It is relatively easy to “undo” if it does not turn out well; most members will not have a vested interest in keeping it, since they would remain directly elected by their respective constituents.   It does not require creating a large number of extra seats.   (As the size of an assembly rises, so does its costs, and the influence of any individual member tends to dwindle).   It is also easy to adjust;  the percentage of PR seats (20%) can be moved up or down in light of practical experience.
The competitors of PR Light tend to have substantial disadvantages:

  • The current system can produce  drastic inequities.   For example, in the last federal election, the Liberals received over four times as many seats per vote as did the Progressive Conservatives.  Strong opposition parties (e.g., those with thirty to forty per cent of the vote) can find themselves with few seats, or none at all.   Smaller, but still significant parties may find themselves perpetually “shut out” of the assembly;
  • The “single transferrable vote”  (STV) system used by Ireland has some theoretical strengths.  It does not appear, however, to be well suited to Canadian conditions and traditions.  STV works only if there are constituencies that elect at least three to five members each.   In Canada -, including British Columbia -  some constituencies would have be enormous geographically to support three to five members.   Gone would be the simple and direct line of accountability between one constituency and one member.  Furthermore, the change from the current system would be drastic and hard to undo if it does not turn out well;
  • “Alternative voting” is, as Winston Churchill once commented, the least rational of all the mainstream alternatives.   It gives undue weight to the second and third choices of the supporters of fringe parties; 
  • The “New Zealand model” (about 50% PR seats) would tend to lose too many of the strengths of the current system.  It can result in too much power for party leaders and too many members who are not directly and clearly accountable to one particular constituency.
I would look forward to assisting the Assembly in any way it considers helpful, including making a presentation.   

As supporting material, I am attaching:

Valuing Canadians: The Options for Voting System Reform in Canada, (Law Commission of Canada, 2003), (in PDF format)
 
Proportional Representation for Canada, (2001) 28 Manitoba Law Journal 133 (in PDF format).

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