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Directly Proportional yet Representative Electoral
System
Under the current system, political parties do not receive the
number of seats suggested by the popular vote. In the
last election, the Liberal party received 97% of the seats with
under 60% of the vote, whereas the Green party received no seats
despite attaining over 10% of the popular vote.
Conversely, to allocate seats purely based on the popular vote, it
would be difficult to choose which candidates represented which
ridings. There is, however, an option to combine these
ideas without sacrificing either ideal at all.
Parties would still run candidates in ridings, and each riding
would elect a representative. However, the parties
receiving fewer seats than suggested by the popular vote would be
able to "top up" their representation. For example:
Party % of
vote seats (old
system) seats (new
system) extra seats needed
A
40
60
60
0
B
30
30
45
15
C 20
10
30
20
D
10
0
15 15
For simplicity, I have assumed 100 ridings.
Party A has received the most seats for their vote:
50% more seats than % of the vote. Party B should
therefore have 45 seats, party C 30 seats, and party D 15 seats --
each 50% more seats than votes. The 50 extra seats
would ensure that each party's seats equalled its popular
vote. They would not officially represent any riding,
because the 100 ridings are already represented by the original 100
seats.
Thus, there would be 150 MLAs: 100 representing
ridings and 50 extra. The number ofseats would vary
every election depending on the results. A limitation
could be put onthe total number of seats in extreme
cases. Furthermore, this does not mean we must
havehundreds of MLAs: we would have the option to
reduce the number of ridings. In the above example,
having 50 ridings would result in 75 seats.
How would we choose the extra MLAs?
I think the easiest and fairest way would be to award them to
the people who did not get elected, but did well in the popular
vote in their particular riding. For example, party B
elected 30 and needs 15 more. The15 would be those who
had the highest percentage of the popular vote in their riding
amonmg the 70 party B losers (in most cases, they would have come
second). This guarentees that these 15 MLAs will come
from 15 different ridings. It is likely that the 50
extra seats will come from close to 50 different ridings; thus the
extra seats will be spread around. The North would be
as likely to have an extra seat as Surrey.
In the event that a political party does not run enough
candidates, they would forego the extra seats.
The expectation is that the extra MLAs would represent the
province as a whole, rather than just their riding. A
person might be elected with only 10% of the vote in their riding;
the reason they would be elected would be because the province as a
whole voted for their party.
But it's unfair to give so much weight to the denser
areas
Good point. Even though the MLAs will be spread
around, there are so many voters in Greater Vancouver that they
will influence the selection of the government moreso than under
the old system. Under the old system, extra voting
weight was intentionally given to smaller, rural areas so that they
would not get forgotten.
We could either accept the directly proportional system that I
have illustrated above, or give each riding equal
weight. We would require a computer to do the
latter. With 79 ridings, each riding's total popular
vote would count toward one-79th of the total provincial vote
count. The result would likely be similar either
way.
Advantages of the aforementioned system
• every person's vote
counts. No one would have to feel that they must vote
for a mainstream party for their vote to be representative.
• every riding still gets a
representative
• the seats are based on the
popular vote, either of the province as a whole or weighing each
riding equally
• the extra seats are chosen
at election time, by the people, from a variety of ridings
• the extra seats go to
people who were popular enough to come close but not quite get
elected
• no run-off election is
needed
• no "easy majorities" with
only 40% of the vote
• no landslides such as in
the 2001 B.C. elections
• coalition governments can
provide balance and prevent one party from having too much
power
• smaller political parties
would elect MLAs
Disadvantages
• we would have to adapt to
having minority governments, and find a way to avoid endless
elections
• regions that have close
votes are likley to get the extra MLAs. If, for
example,rural ridings tended to won by large majorities (as the
Canadian Alliance tends to do federally), the extra seats would
tend to come from urban areas (and vice versa). This
would not affect the seats awarded to each party; but it would
influence where the extra MLAs came from.
• we would have to either
pay for more politicians or reduce the number of ridings
• dubious special interest
parties might get a representative or two. If that were
the case, it might be hard to decide who gets to be in the next
provincial debate.
Other Comments
• It is possible
to only allow parties receiving, say, at least 5% of the vote to
have representatives. That would eliminate too many
special interest parties. However, I disagree with
doing this. It seems fairest to allow these groups to
have representatives if some of the people choose them.
• I believe a
minority/coalition situation if preferable to majority rule,
because it means politicians must negotiate with each other, rather
than giving one party too much power. I also believe we
should have set 4-year terms. That means that a
minority government could not be defeated. Budgets, for
example, would have to be negotiated. In the case of an
impasse, perhaps the two top parties could each put forward a
budget, and the MLAs could vote for one or the either.
• Independents could still
be elected by receiving the most votes in their respective ridings,
as is currently the case. Only the extra MLAs could not
be independents.
• If this or any other
system were put to a referendum of the people of British Columbia,
I would favour breaking it down into more than one element if
possible. For example:
question
1: Do you wish British Columbia to change to a
Directly Proportional yet Representative Electoral System, as
outlined above?
question
2: If the above system is adopted, do you wish
each riding's popular vote to be worth one-79th of the total vote,
or to simply use the total provincial popular vote?
question
3: If the above system is adopted, do you wish
to exclude political parties receiving less that 5% of the popular
vote from extra seats?
Question 3 could be divided further, so that the
voters could decide whether to use 5%, 2%
etc.:
a)
5%
b)
2%
c)
1%
d) no exclusion
In this case, the median would be used ("no exclusion" counting
as 0%) My point is that too often, voters are expected to vote on
an entire package, even if they dislike some of its
elements. It seems more democratic to allow this kind
of flexibility.