In the event that changes to the B.C. electoral system occur as
the result of this exercise, and if any of these beneficial changes
can be traced back to recommendations from individual persons,
perhaps based on the earlier date of the formal communication of
those ideas in the event of duplications, it would be a commendable
act if those persons could be given prizes, or some other form of
civic recognition for their contributions. This would be far
superior to having the Reviewing Board assume unsupportable
authorship for every good idea that is presented to them that they
adopt.
With that thought in mind, I suggest the following. That the
electoral system be kept essentially the way it is, with the
exception that ten (10) new seats be added to the provincial
assembly as “popular vote”, or
“provincial” seats. These ten proposed
seats would be automatically allocated following an election based
entirely on the percentage of province-wide votes cast for the
parties running, with numbers being rounded off to the nearest
whole number. It would be up to the political parties as to whom
they chose to fill the positions. There are several advantages to
this plan.
1) It would free the leaders of the political parties
from having two conflicting roles to play during an election where
they now have to seek election both separately in their own
constituencies and in the province as a whole.
2) It would mean that other political interests such
as fringe parties that have considerable numerical support
province-wide, but never enough in any single electoral district to
elect an MLA, would now be able to send their own representatives
to Victoria.
3) It would partially address the question of
fairness where a losing party obtained a higher popular vote
province-wide than the party that won the election.
4) It would reduce the impact of extreme one-party
majorities instead of enhancing them.
In this system, it is essential that both types of MLA should
have identical rights and responsibilities and that a vote from a
“constituent” MLA should have no more, nor
any less weight than one from a
“provincial” MLA.
In the event that adding ten new members might be thought to
make the Legislative Assembly too large, the number of electoral
districts could be proportionally reduced by enlarging their voting
areas. This would reduce the number of
“constituent” MLAs who could be elected.
Notably, at no time should the number of
“provincial” seats be made more numerous
than ten, and the number of “constituent”
seats must remain sufficiently numerous not to be overpowered by
the “provincial” seats
Only where the popular vote exceeds 20% is there any risk of an
un-elected person becoming an MLA. This is because at 10%, it is
presumably the well-publicized president of the party running who
assumes the position of MLA. At 20% and 30%, the MLA positions
would go to the nominees of the political party winning that
popular vote. Theoretically, but unlikely, they could be given to
people the voters knew nothing about. On the other hand, there is
already in place the precedent of an un-elected president of a
political party requiring an elected MLA to step down so he can
take over his position.
It is hoped that these ideas will be considered in your
deliberations.