[To see this submission in its original format, see the linked
document below]
SUMMARY OF SUBMISSION
This submission:
-
Supports the introduction of a mixed member proportional (MMP)
representation electoral system in British Columbia;
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Summarises the presenter’s experience as a New
Zealand voter living under both “first past the
post” (FPTP) and MMP, and the transition from one
system to the other; and
-
Recommends a provincial referendum to ask for voter approval of
a change to an MMP system.
NZ HISTORY
It is assumed that the Assembly has had access to resources
available to understand the changes that have occurred in New
Zealand. If not, I suggest a review of
http://www.electionresources.org/nz/ ,
which contains an excellent summary of the changeover to MMP and
the relevant statistics.
The first election held under MMP was in 1996, and there have
been two subsequent elections. Prior to that NZ had utilized a FPTP
system for over eighty years.
MERITS AND FLAWS OF FPTP
Merits:
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Clearly preferred regional representation in individual
ridings;
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In general, clear majority governments are also easily
formed.
Flaws:
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Effectively FPTP results in a two-party system –
elections become competitions between the two parties with the
greatest resources (usually, one on the centre left and one on the
centre right), minority votes are effectively
“lost” and minority parties are unable to
secure seats;
-
One party also tends to dominate for long periods of time. In
New Zealand, for example, the conservative National Party held
power for decades punctuated by sporadic and short bursts of power
held by the Labour Party;
-
Regularly the dominance is so strong that it results in no
effective opposition;
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This leads to complacency on the part of the dominant
government;
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It also results in a lack of debate in the House; and
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On occasion, the governing party which has won the most seats
has actually only secured a minority of votes. This occurs because
of the imbalance and size in population and area of urban and rural
ridings.
STIMULUS FOR CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND
In New Zealand, research into alternatives was driven by the
high level of voter dissatisfaction with the FPTP system. The
actual impetus to change was, of course, political will. Committed
political will is crucial to see through a change.
The research was begun in 1985: by the time voters were asked in
1992 in a non-binding referendum if they wanted to change the
electoral system. Voter turnout was high: 55%. The vote was 84.7%
in favour of a change to the system. MMP was given a 70.5% approval
rating as the choice of alternative system.
When a binding referendum was held one year later, voter turnout
was 85%, and 54% voted in favour of MMP, which then came into
effect for the 1996 election.
HOW DOES MMP WORK?
By way of a very simplistic explanation:
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All voters get two votes, one for a local candidate in their
riding and one for a party;
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The local candidate with the greatest number of candidate votes
in his or her riding wins the seat;
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There are a fixed number of such local seats – 69,
including 4 dedicated Maori seats;
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There are 120 seats in the House altogether;
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The remaining seats are filled by “list”
candidates. These are people on a pre-election set list for each
party. Each elected party can “top up” its
seats in the House from people on the list in order to ensure it
has the proportional representation in the House that its party
vote indicates it should have.
-
To qualify, a party must win at least one seat or receive 5% or
more of the party vote.
EXPERIENCES IN NEW ZEALAND
On the downside:
Over three electoral terms a number of things have
“shaken down.” It must be expected that
wrinkles will require ironing out. For example:
-
There will, at least initially, be more inexperienced members in
the House;
The spread of the vote has resulted on all three occasions in the
need to negotiate coalition governments;
-
List members have no home riding to represent. In one sense,
they are sometimes seen as “second-class”
members because they are not specifically elected;
-
Tensions and “turf wars” can occur
between the elected member in a riding and a list member resident
in the same riding;
-
Technical problems can arise. For example, fairly quickly
several list members defected from their parties but declared an
intention to continue sitting as independents – a
nonsense notion given they hold their seats in the first place by
virtue of their party affiliation. (This loophole has now been
closed.)
On the upside:
The merits of MMP appear to vastly outweigh any downsides, which
are relatively straightforward to deal with:
-
Over three electoral terms, experience has come and many of the
initial stumbling blocks have been removed or overcome
(inexperience on the part of new members may not be a bad thing
– they won’t have as many bad habits);
-
Because the traditional style of parliamentary debate is
retained, there are already rules and a structure in place to
govern such inexperience (for example, the Speaker);
-
As to coalition negotiations, experience has made this process
faster and more amenable to compromise as time has progressed (in
New Zealand, after the first election, the negotiations took days
and ended in a result not expected by most voters; by the time of
the last election, experience had resulted in extensive
pre-election negotiations that smoothed the way to a speedy and
practical resumption of government immediately following the
election);
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When it comes to “turf wars” in ridings
between list and elected members, from a voter perspective, this is
fine – regionally, it means they have not one voice in
the House, but often two or more, all working to keep each other
honest;
-
Debate is a great deal more extensive. There is more flexibility
between parties to negotiate sound compromises that serve the
public better. Standing committee processes become more
representative instead of being “patsy”
processes simply funnelling legislation through, and minority
parties are able to have a substantial influence on government
policy and represent their constituencies effectively. For example,
the Green Party in New Zealand (which holds 9 seats) has managed to
achieve substantial progress on bio-security and GM foods. Prior to
MMP, it could not even win one seat and was unable to be
influential in any manner;
-
Debate is also slowed down significantly. This is a good thing!
Significant legislation cannot be simply rushed through the
House.
-
Finally, and perhaps most importantly: voters get the truly
representative legislature they deserve.
IN SUMMARY:
MMP makes the voter’s voice count –
because the voter gets exactly what he or she asked for. The
experience in New Zealand has shown it to be a system that has
greater benefits for the constituency than the FPTP system. As the
function of government is to serve its constituency, I submit it is
imperative to call for a change to this system in British Columbia
as soon as a referendum can be held.
Writer bio:
The writer of this submission is a Canadian citizen, a freelance
journalist and author, and is not affiliated to any political
party. Prior to moving to British Columbia, she has lived and voted
in New Zealand over the course of 8 elections.